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Abstract 
During the recent years, Russia has been accused in meddling in the internal affairs of 
Western countries on several occasions. Claims of Russian information campaign have 
also surfaced related to the Catalan independence referendum, held on 1 October 2017. 
Although there have been some analyses the author is not aware of any wider academic 
research examining Russian information activity related to the referendum.  
The aim of the thesis was to identify the strategic narratives that Russia disseminated to 
the English-language audience in relation to the Catalan independence referendum, and 
connect them with broader Russian foreign policy interests. The author, inter alia, seek 
to ascertain why Russia was interested in Catalonia in the first place and how it is used 
various communicative tools to achieve its goals. The author set a hypothesis that Russia 
was taking advantage of the events in Catalonia to enfeeble the European Union.  
To test the hypothesis the author conducted a poststructuralist discourse analysis on the 
content of Sputnik and RT that was published between 1 September and 31 October 2017. 
Apart from the news articles, television coverage of RT was also analysed. The coverage 
was viewed through the prism of the strategic narratives theory by Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin and Roselle in connexion with the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe.  
The author ascertained that the tense and at times violent conflict in Catalonia gave Russia 
a pretext to amplify the tensions and direct the coverage towards the European Union. 
Russia first argued for the intervention of the EU to give the conflict an international 
dimension. As the EU remained a bystander, Russia actively projected an identity 
narrative of the EU as hypocritical and not living up to the democratic values it serves to 
epitomise. EU was shown in decay and in the process of disintegration with an intent to 
weaken the West’s hegemony and by doing this strive for a multilateral world order where 
the role of Russia would be increased. The hypothesis was thus confirmed. 
The work contributes to the wider efforts of elucidating the range and technique of 
Russian information activities and demonstrates that Russia has vested interest not only 
in its close neighbourhood but also further away where it is not and active player itself.  
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 6 
1. Theoretical framework .......................................................................................................... 7 
1.1. The theory of strategic narratives .................................................................................. 7 
1.2. Russian strategic narratives ......................................................................................... 11 
2. Sputnik and RT: tools for Russian information activity ..................................................... 15 
3. Empirical part ...................................................................................................................... 18 
3.1. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 18 
3.2. Discourse analysis ....................................................................................................... 21 
3.2.1. Madrid’s repressive measures and the ghosts of General Franco ....................... 21 
3.2.2. A dream of independence supported by the masses ............................................ 24 
3.2.3. Criticism of the independence movement and the Russian position ................... 27 
3.2.4. The hypocrisy and double standards of the European Union .............................. 28 
3.2.5. The European Union responsible for the crisis ................................................... 30 
3.2.6. Disintegration of Europe ..................................................................................... 32 
3.3. Discussion ........................................................................................................................ 33 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 36 
References ................................................................................................................................... 38 
Appendices .................................................................................................................................. 51 
Appendix 1. Coverage of Catalonia in Sputnik and RT September – October 2017. ............. 51 
Appendix 2. Chronology of the events in Catalonia. .............................................................. 53 
Appendix 3. Opinion leaders. ................................................................................................. 55 
Resümee ...................................................................................................................................... 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Since the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, the West has witnessed 
Russia grow more forceful and fearless in its foreign policy undertakings. Russia has been 
accused in meddling in the internal affairs of Western countries on several occasions.  In 
January 2017, the United States intelligence community assessed that Vladimir Putin had 
personally ordered an “influence campaign” to harm the electoral chances of Hillary 
Clinton and “undermine public faith in the US democratic process” (Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence 2017). Across the Atlantic, Emmanuel Macron, following the 
French elections in 2017, accused Sputnik and RT acting like “agents of influence and 
propaganda” that spread “serious falsehoods” (Politico 2017). 
Claims of Russian political meddling have also surfaced related to the Catalan 
independence referendum, held on 1 October 2017. Spanish government has contended 
that Russia-based groups used social media to spread “misinformation” related to the 
referendum (Cotovio and Grinberg 2017). A report by El País claimed that the RT used 
its Spanish-language portal to “spread stories on the Catalan crisis with a bias against 
constitutional legality” (Alandete 2017). This was corroborated by the head of the 
German domestic intelligence service BfV on 17 May who said it was very probable 
Moscow had carried out a disinformation campaign to encourage voters to back splitting 
from Spain (Keeley, 2018). Mira Milosevich-Juaristi (2017) argues that Russia applied a 
combination of various instruments of information warfare, concentrating primarily on 
transmitting both true and false messages on social networks. Russian foreign minister 
Sergei Lavrov has denied these claims, arguing that the accusations are an example of the 
“rampant anti-Russian hysteria in the West” (Ara 2017). A report sent to the UK 
Parliament’s “fake news” committee also states that these claims are based on 
misinterpretation of data resources and poor research methodology (McGrath 2018).   
Apart from analyses concentrating on social networks and Spanish-language RT the 
author is not aware of any wider academic research examining Russian information 
activity related to the Catalan referendum. The thesis seeks to contribute to this effort by 
concentrating on the narratives that Russian government-sponsored international media 
outlets Sputnik and RT disseminated to the English-language audience. 
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The main aim of the thesis is to identify the strategic narratives that Russia disseminated 
to the English-language audience in relation to the Catalan independence referendum and 
connect them with Russian foreign policy interests, i.e. the broader Russian understanding 
on how the international system ought to function. The author, inter alia, seeks to 
ascertain why Russia was interested in Catalonia in the first place and how it is used 
various communicative tools to achieve its goals. The hypothesis is that Russia was taking 
advantage of the events in Catalonia to enfeeble the European Union.  
The author views the coverage of Sputnik and RT through the prism of the strategic 
narratives theory by Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle (2013; 
2017) in connexion with the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe 
(1985). In their novel approach, Miskimmon et al. argue that the analysis of narratives is 
central to understanding the major dynamics in international affairs, especially the power 
of persuasion. The theory gives priority to the role of communication in international 
relations and takes into account the changing media ecology of the 21st century making it 
thus appropriate to the study of Russian information activities. As the theory of strategic 
narratives is largely based on poststructuralist studies of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe’s 
theory was chosen for it gives the essential tools to study the pro-Russian discourse.  
To examine the strategic narratives disseminated by Russia, the author conducted a 
poststructuralist discourse analysis on the content of Russian international media outlets 
Sputnik and RT. In addition to the news articles related to Catalonia that were published 
on Sputnik and RT’s websites, television coverage of RT found from its Youtube page 
was also analysed to get a more complete view of the coverage. The period under study 
is 1 September to 31 October 2017. Altogether 422 news articles (257 published by 
Sputnik 165 published by RT) and 51 videos were analysed (Appendix 1). 
The thesis commences with a theoretical chapter that first outlines the main tenets of the 
strategic narratives theory and then continues with a more specific explanation of the 
perception of the world by Russia and its role in it. The second chapter comprises of a 
critical literature overview of the goals and tools of Russian information activity. The 
author will then move on to conduct a discourse analysis on the media coverage of 
Sputnik and RT to identity the main narratives disseminated by Russia. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion linking the empirical part with the theoretical framework. 
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1. Theoretical framework 
The first part of this chapter outlines the basic features of the strategic narratives theory 
– the types and characters of strategic narratives, their place in the realm of international 
relations and relation to the construction of order and information infrastructure. The 
second part continues with a more specific explanation of how Russia perceives the world 
and its role in it. It is mainly based on the work of Alister Miskimmon and Ben 
O’Loughlin (2017) and Laura Roselle (Roselle 2017).  
1.1. The theory of strategic narratives 
“Make America Great Again”, climate change, Fukushima’s “end of history” –  the world 
consists of different narratives. Storytelling – what happened and will happen in life and 
how we should perceive the world around us – has been integral to how people simplify 
and organize their understanding of the complex processes taking place. The concept of 
narratives has been studied more extensively from the second half of the 20th century.  
Todorov (1977, 45) views narratives as frameworks that allow us to connect apparently 
unconnected phenomena around some causal transformation, giving meaning to all parts 
of the whole. ÓTuathail (2002, 617) sees narratives in connection to stories: “storylines 
are sense-making organizational devices tying the different elements of a policy challenge 
together into a reasonably coherent and convincing narrative”. It is up to the narrator to 
decide the content of the message – what aspects should be included and how they should 
be presented (Antoniades et al. 2010, 4).  
Narratives are central to the understanding of international relations and world order. 
They are distinguished by a specific structure, entailing an initial order, a problem 
disrupting that stability, and a resolution that re-establishes the order, though the end-
state might differ from the initial situation (Antoniades et al. 2010, 4). Narratives consist 
of (1) characters or actors (agents), (2) setting/environment/space (scene), (3) conflict or 
action (act), (4) tools/behaviour (agency), and (5) resolution/goal (purpose) (Miskimmon 
et al. 2017, 7). They do not necessarily need to possess an identifiable author since the 
narrativity of events and situations is dependent on the interpretation of the audience. For 
example, there was no author of the end of the Cold War but events could still be 
interpreted using features inherent to narratives (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 13). 
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Arsenault et al. (2017, 192) propose that for a narrative to be strategic they must have a 
coercive effect – akin to law – of assuring that “the story predicted or ordered by the 
narrative will take place or threatening severe consequences to relevant actors if it does 
not.” The strategic narrative concept is influenced by Lawrence Freedman (2006, 22) who 
focused on the strategic deployment of narratives to counter opponents in military 
conflict. He saw strategic narratives as a tool to challenge the legitimacy of enemy forces.  
Strategic narratives have a twofold effect. They first act as tools of political 
communication used to persuade international actors and shape their behaviour in an 
observable way. “If your strategic narrative is convincing, allies will commit resources, 
publics will re-elect your party to continue your foreign policy, and enemies will realize 
their prospects are bleak unless they change course” (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 17). In 
addition to that, the processes of strategic narratives are also central to the identity and 
interests of the international actors by constituting the experience of international affairs. 
“If your state convinced another state to commit to specific policies and actions on a 
consistent basis, [...], then the other state may come to take on the identity of a state that 
carries out such policies naturally, as an expression of their values” (ibid., 103). In that 
sense strategic narratives theory is constructivist because reality (e.g. hierarchy, order, 
events) is viewed through lenses and prisms, rather than directly and unmediated. “If 
anarchy is what states make of it, then what they make of it depends on the narratives 
they experience reality through” (ibid., 108). 
In the long term, political actors – usually elites – use strategic narratives to shape the 
understanding of policies and events and give determined meaning to the past, present 
and the future to achieve political objectives (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 2–5). They use 
strategic narratives to project their vision of the world and their place in it (their identity) 
and thus alter the international system to their benefit. “The hope for political actors is 
that strong narratives will triumph over counternarratives, that legitimacy will be 
strengthened, that power will be heightened” (Miskimmon et al. 2017, 1).  
Miskimmon et al. (2013; 2017) distinguish between three types of narratives: system 
narratives, identity narratives, and issue narratives. System narratives articulate how a 
political actor understands international order, the structural basis of the world: who the 
main players are, how the system should function, which actors pose a challenge to the 
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system. (Bially Mattern 2005; Hurrell 2005; Roselle 2017). A classic example of it would 
be a narrative of the Cold War that set out a vision of a bipolar world with two opposing 
ideologies (capitalism vs. socialism) vying for world dominance. Arab Spring or The War 
on Terror fall into this category. 
Identity narratives concern the identities of actors in international affairs. They lay out 
the values and goals of the political actors and shape perceptions of what is appropriate 
for them to do in a given context (Holsti 1970; Thies 2012a and 2012b, Miskimmon and 
O’Loughlin 2017). The identity of actors in international affairs is in a process of constant 
negotiation and contestation (Roselle 2017, 58).  
Policy narratives seek to influence the development of policies and “outline how an actor 
views the appropriate response to address a political challenge or crisis and articulate a 
position based on material interest (Miskimmon and O’Loughlin 2017, 112). They aim to 
establish a common-sense understanding of why a policy is needed and desirable and how 
it will resolve the underlying issue (Miskimmon et al. 2017, 8). Policy narratives, like 
identity narratives, may support or undermine system narratives: “Building a broadly-
based coalition for war supports a very different narrative about the international system 
than does a unilateral and preemptive use of force” (Roselle 2017, 58). 
It should be stressed that system, identity and policy narratives are all linked to each other 
and should therefore be in harmony (coherent and plausible) in order to be effective. 
“Contradictions between narratives at different levels can undermine the effectiveness of 
strategic narratives related to policy” (Miskimmon et al. 2017, 8). 
Strategic narratives are vital for our expectations and understanding of the international 
system and world order. They indicate our understandings of actors and polarity and the 
identification of great powers, they also highlight expectations about the behaviour of 
kinds of states (e.g. great powers and rogue states). (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 67). They 
also set the terms for collaboration and cooperation in the order and make predictions 
about rising and falling powers, threats, enemies and allies (ibid.).  
Strategic narratives offer explanation for three aspects of international order: (1) they 
contribute to how order is conceived, (2) they are involved in the production of order, and 
(3) the maintenance of order (ibid., 61, 89). Based on the material power distribution, 
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international actors aim to shape perceptions and understandings of the world to condition 
favourable behaviour from other actors. The success of great powers largely rests on their 
ability to convince others of the legitimacy of their narratives of the international system.  
When looking at international relations, strategic narratives alongside material resources 
play a central role in determining whether great powers are able to shape a new systemic 
alignment. Through the use of strategic narratives powers can project their values and 
interests to extend their influence and change the discursive environment in which they 
operate. “These are narratives about both states and the system itself, both about ’who we 
are’ and ’what kind of system we want’” (Antoniades et al. 2010, 2).  
Narratives are continuously contested and negotiated. The contestation might involve 
eliminating the rival’s narratives by destroying the conditions that make them plausible. 
Sometimes, though, it might be more useful to keep the opposing narratives alive to add 
legitimacy by comparing the narratives: “The credibility of the strategic narratives of the 
US and USSR during the Cold War was enhanced by the opportunity to compare, 
contrast, and denigrate the other’s narrative” (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 104).  For a 
narrative to be successful it needs to capture the audience’s attention and be convincing. 
A degree of ambiguity is also needed so that audiences can interpret the ideas in ways 
most preferable to them. (ibid., 110–113). 
International actors use various types of media, such as the diplomacy or propaganda, to 
persuade other actors through the formation and projection of strategic narratives. Due to 
that reason, Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle (2013, 151) see the media ecology – 
understood as environment, sum of all media devices – as an intrinsic part of the 
international relations that ought not to be downplayed.  As James Carey (1989, 87) put 
it: “reality is a scarce resource…the fundamental form of power is the power to define, 
allocate, and display that resource.” To control the projection of the strategic narratives, 
political actors seek to control and shape the conversations in the media ecologies by 
distributing their narratives and directing communication towards topics and frames most 
suitable for their agenda (Miskimmon et al. 2013, 150–152). The work of strategic 
communication and public diplomacy falls into this sphere. In addition, they must also 
compete to control and steer the overall infrastructure of these ecologies itself since it 
privileges certain voices and certain ways of communicating over others: “They must 
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ensure supportive voices have an opportunity to be heard [...] and that oppositional voices 
are side-lined, or at the very least countered.” (ibid., 170). 
Media ecology conditions how the information is spread in the society. A change in that 
structure (e.g. rapid technological development) is also accompanied with a change in the 
distribution and form of authority and power. With the advent of digital media, media 
ecologies have undergone a significant realignment during the last decade (Miskimmon 
et al. 2017, 10). This has changed radically who is able to project narratives and allowed 
for more competition to challenge the narratives of great powers of the system. “Not only 
have we witnessed the recent proliferation of transnational television channels such as Al 
Jazeera, Telesur, […], BBC World and CNN International, but many of these media 
organisations also provide platforms and interactive features allowing for forms of public 
participation and conversation” (Antoniades et al. 2010, 7). 
Political actors are now able to communicate directly with the audience in other states 
instantly and continuously. Due to that reason these media organisations act as tools for 
strategic narratives by transmitting content overseas (ibid.). They also allow a “new 
‘bottom up’ public diplomacy by enabling publics to interact and, perhaps, ‘influence’ 
each other independently of government communications, with ‘soft power’ 
reconceptualised as horizontal and dispersed” (ibid.). 
1.2. Russian strategic narratives 
Many academics and authors see the world order currently in a transition process moving 
towards new post-Cold War power dynamics. The move towards a multipolar 
international system has also been noted in Russian Foreign Policy Concepts of 2013 and 
2016 that stress that the global economic and political dominance of the traditional 
western powers is eroding fast (Foreign Policy Concept 2013, 2016). Miskimmon et al. 
(2013, 64) argue that a central concept shared by many approaches to international order 
is the balance of power between the powerful units in the system. As Michael Barnett 
(2010) notes, this power balance has not been achieved in the post-Cold War world of US 
hegemony yet. There are debates taking place about the longevity and stability of the US-
led world order with some scholars such as Bacevich (2002), Layne (2006) and Nye 
(2003) arguing that US is making use of its current world dominance to the detriment of 
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its future standing. According to Barry Buzan (2011), the world is entering a new period 
without superpowers.  
According to Miskimmon et al. (2017) the new power dynamics will be mainly achieved 
by the contestation and projection of different strategic (system, identity, policy) 
narratives by the international actors. Robert Gilpin (1981) has argued that whereas 
history has shown the great power contestation to be a violent process (hence the term 
“hegemonic war”) the international system is changing, and great powers do not seem to 
seek global dominance anymore, looking for international recognition of their great 
power status instead.  
With the demise of the Cold War, binary narratives of good vs. evil, capitalism vs. 
communism etc. were no more enough to tie states together into opposing camps as they 
used to (Roselle 2017, 60). In fact, both the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail 
Gorbachev (1988), and the United States, George H. W. Bush (1990), used the phrase 
“new world order” to describe a new era in international relations which would be based 
on increased cooperation between the power blocks. “In the 1990s changes in the 
international system opened space for the articulation of new strategic narratives about 
the international system itself” (Roselle 2017, 60). 
According to various authors (English 2000; Mankoff 2009), Russia was going through 
a major transitional period in the 1990s, trying to find its place in the world. Different 
system and identity narratives were intensely contested. As Bennett (1999, 306–309) 
argues, there were three competing system narratives put forward by different camps in 
Russia. The liberals, particularly Andrei Kozyrev, emphasised the importance of 
maintaining good relations with the West and did not favour any use of force in the near 
abroad. The pragmatists like Ivan Rybkin or Grigory Yavlinsky were willing to use force 
only as a last resort and argued that Russia had to balance its priorities between the West 
and Eurasia (ibid.; Light 1996, 46–47). Nationalists such as Alexander Rutskoy saw 
Russia as a leading power in the region that ought to be more assertive in fighting for its 
interests (Bennett 1999, 323). 
The political elite led by Boris Yeltsin embraced the Western liberal narrative whereas 
the public was not as enthusiastic (Clunan 2009, 54–55). These opposing narratives 
conflicted during the Chechen Wars. Roselle (2017, 57) argues that the war in Chechnya 
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challenged the emerging liberal narratives that emphasised cooperation. Great power 
narratives were reasserted and renewed as the use of force was seen the primary way to 
counter the perceived security threats. While the Russian political elite and the public first 
wanted to see its country as part of the European community this narrative began to 
crumble in the mid-1900s “as the Russian leadership began to question the willingness of 
Europe, and especially of the United States, to include Russia in a substantive and 
meaningful way in a European community” (ibid., 79).  
This shift of narratives played into the hands of Vladimir Putin who has since taken a 
more assertive foreign political stance, turning away from identity narrative of Russia as 
a Europe oriented liberal democratic country (ibid.). To justify the use of force in 
Chechnya, Russia has since started to return to its great power status in the world. 
Perceiving a threat to the security and order in Russia, the public has also sided to show 
considerable support for the authoritarian leadership of Putin (Roselle 2017, 74–79). 
The Cold War era great power narratives that reemerged during the Chechen Wars were 
also reasserted as Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and continue to undermine the system 
narratives that emphasise international cooperation and shared interests (ibid.). These 
narratives also continue to play a major role domestically as leaders try not to “look 
weak”. Roselle (2017, 79) suggests that “narratives that emphasise cooperation with the 
West might not resonate with the public if this cooperation is perceived as weakness”.  
Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2017, 115–116) identify the three main Russian strategic 
narratives of the international system: (1) the narrative of multipolarity and polycentrism; 
(2) the narrative of prestige, equality and mutual respect; (3) the narrative of the Common 
European Home.  
The narrative of multipolarity and polycentrism promotes the emergence of a polycentric 
world order. Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 marked that “Russia shall seek to 
achieve a multi-polar system of international relations that really reflects the diversity of 
the modern world with its great variety of interests” (Foreign Policy Concept 2000). 
Miskimmon and O’Loughlin note (2017, 116) that more recently reinforcing the 
multilateral world order has meant countering the dominance of the US and the West by 
stressing the relative decline of the West and the rise of the rest of the world. 
“Globalisation has led to the formation of new centres of economic and political power. 
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Global power and development potential is becoming decentralised, and is shifting 
towards the Asia-Pacific Region, eroding the global and political dominance of the 
traditional western powers” (Foreign Policy Concept 2016). Legvold (2017, 1026) 
contends that the West has underestimated the threat coming from Russia that seeks to 
challenge the existing world order. 
The narrative of prestige, equality and mutual respect demands for greater recognition of 
Russian standing in the world by the West. It contends that Russia should play a more 
active role in the international arena, being part of the other great powers in reinforcing 
world order. This was first promulgated in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2000 
which claimed that Russia should be more active in solving international challenges both 
on the regional and global level (Foreign Policy Concept 2000). In the Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2016 this was furthermore asserted as “consolidating Russian Federation’s 
position as a centre of influence in today’s world” was mentioned as one of the main 
foreign policy objectives of Russia (Foreign Policy Concept 2016).  
The third Russian strategic narrative that Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2017, 116) bring 
forth is the narrative of the Common European Home that resents the fact that Russia has 
not been fully included in the post-Cold War European order (e.g. NATO and the EU). 
“Exclusion has been a common narrative in Russian foreign policy documents and public 
speeches since the 1990s” (ibid.). The authors note that it is difficult to construct an 
inclusive Common European Home narrative since the system and identity narratives of 
the EU and NATO are framed to counter the Russian narrative due to its aggressive 
foreign policy actions in the region (ibid.). 
On the surface, there are signs of potential Russian and Western narrative convergence in 
highlighting the importance of international law, democracy and the centrality of markets. 
The problem though is in the interpretation of these concepts which makes the possibility 
of any cooperation between the West and Russia difficult. “Those outside Russia may 
simply not believe Lavrov when he says Russia’s ideological affinity to ‘democratic 
principles’ reflects the same affinity in the West, for instance” (Miskimmon and 
O’Loughlin 2017, 114). Hill (2016) marks that this could lead to an endless cycle of 
miscommunication and frustration on both sides.  
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2. Sputnik and RT: tools for Russian information activity 
The activities and coverage of Sputnik and RT could be examined as part of the much 
broader context of Russian information warfare which has intensified since the outbreak 
of the war in Ukraine over three years ago (Richter 2017; Darczewska 2014). One of the 
main tenets of the Russian information thought is the speech of the Chief of the General 
Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia Valery Gerasimov from January 2013. Talking to 
the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, Gerasimov contended that political goals can 
no longer be achieved through conventional means but through the “widespread use of 
disinformation, of political, economic, humanitarian, and other non-military measures 
deployed in connection with the protest potential of the population” (Gerasimov 2013). 
The Iraq War and the Arab Spring, both allegedly instigated by the West, served as a 
proof to Gerasimov that it is only a matter of days that a nation could be transformed into 
an arena of bitter conflict and descend into chaos (ibid.).  
Many authors (Giles 2016, 37; Pomerantsev 2014; Pomerantsev and Weiss 2014, 6) see 
that the main goal of Russian information campaigns has been to create doubt and 
confusion. NATO Chief of Communications, Mark Laity (2016), has explained that “The 
aim [of Russian disinformation] is to make you trust nobody and bury you in various 
explanations of a story.” Stefan Meister (2016, 3) argues that the Russian media outlets 
are geared towards “revealing” the weaknesses of Western societies and influencing 
politics within member states with the ultimate aim of “paralyzing and sabotaging the 
decision-making processes of EU and NATO, organizations that depend on consensus”. 
Pomerantsev (2015, 16) sees the underlying goal of Kremlin’s propaganda to engender 
cynicism: “Cynicism is useful to the state: When people stop trusting any institutions or 
having any firmly held values, they can easily accept a conspiratorial vision of the world.” 
Thornton (2015) believes Russia has developed a “new generation of warfare”, 
Darczewska (2014) and Snegovaya (2015) see it as a re-invention of the Soviet Cold War-
era model that was based on reflexive control, a means of conveying to an opponent 
specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined 
decision desired by the initiator of the action (Thomas 2004, 237). Reflexive control can 
also be seen as one of the primary goals of Russian disinformation campaigns (Bjola and 
Pamment 2016, 6; Snegovaya 2015, 10).  
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RT, founded in 2005, is registered as an autonomous non-profit organisation that is 
funded by the Federal Agency on Press and Media Communications of the Russian 
Federation (Richter 2017, 23). Sputnik, launched in 2014, is part of the Rossiya Segodnya 
news agency, owned and operated by the Russian government, created by an Executive 
Order of the President of Russia (Pizzi 2013). According to the Decree of the Vladimir 
Putin, the mandate of the agency is to “provide information on Russian state policy and 
Russian life and society for audiences abroad” (RT 2013). Although “Rossiya Segodnya” 
directly translated from Russian to English as “Russia Today”, the agency is officially “in 
any way related” to RT (ibid.). Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of Rossiya 
Segodnya, concurrently also serves as the editor-in-chief of the English-language RT 
though (BBC 2013). Thus, Sputnik and RT could be viewed as part of one system. 
During the recent years, Russian government has heavily invested in the international 
media to enhance its soft power (Lankina and Niemczyk 2015). RT’s budget has grown 
from $30 million in 2005 (Richter 2017, 23) to about $310 million with plans for an 
increase of $19 million over the years of 2017–2019 (The Moscow Times 2016). 
According Margarita Simonyan, Sputnik’s budget was about $90 million in 2015 
(Nehezin 2014). 
Table 1. Popularity of international broadcasters in social networks. 
Broadcaster Number of likes/followers (10.05.2018) 
Facebook Twitter Youtube 
RT   5 127 955   2 700 000 2 551 673 
Sputnik   1 206 254      221 000      39 038 
BBC News 46 525 551 23 400 000 2 459 955 
France24   8 645 160   3 010 000    642 509 
RT’s presence is active on social media (Table 1), especially on Youtube, where it became 
the first television news channel to break one billion views (Richter 2017). However, the 
true extent of its viewership is difficult to pin down for the network has exaggerated its 
popularity in the past (ibid. 32).  Furthermore, the majority of its most viral videos are 
not political in nature, featuring natural disasters, accidents, crime, and natural 
phenomenon instead. “RT’s political news videos, featuring the content by which it seeks 
to shape Western opinion and thus justify its existence, accounted for a mere 1 percent of 
its total YouTube exposure, with fewer than 4 million views” (Zavadski 2015).  
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RT first started out as Russia Today, intended to adhere to the professional formats 
developed by TV channels such as BBC or CNN to give the Western audiences the “the 
perspective on the world from Russia” (Sputnik 2005). The channel rose to international 
prominence during the Russo-Georgian war when it covered the conflict from a highly 
defensive, pro-Russian position (Richter 2017, 8). Simonyan later admitted that Russia 
Today waged an information war to defend the actions of Russia in Georgia and described 
its role as the soft power equivalent of Russian Ministry of Defence (Gabuev 2012).  
In 2009, the network changed its name to RT and shifted its focus to international news, 
rebranding itself as a challenger to Western hegemony (Pomerantsev 2015, 56-57). “The 
Western world as we knew it and appreciated it, with its Western values, no longer 
exists,” Simonyan has previously said (Alandete 2018). RT’s slogan, “Question more”, 
that implies bias in Western media was developed by McCann, the same advertising firm 
that once helped the US sell the Marshall Plan (Rutenberg 2017). Following RT one might 
stumble upon ad’s saying “Subscribe to RT newsletter to get stories the mainstream media 
won’t tell you”. Sputnik also has a similar slogan of “Telling the untold”. 
Regarding the tools of disinformation used by Russia, Marcel von Herpen (2016, 1) has 
noted that besides outright lies (fake news), Putin’s regime also heavily relies on half-
truths and truths out of context. Sometimes the sources that are quoted are in fact non-
existent (Kragh and Åsperg 2017) or previous disinformation is used as a source of 
legitimacy, leading to echo chambers of disinformation (Bjola and Pannent 2016, 5). 
Another technique that has made a comeback from the Soviet era is that of whataboutism 
that aims to divert attention away from the main issue at hand, often creating a vague 
analogy of something that looks vaguely similar to something in the West (Bader 2017). 
This would for example include comparing the human rights situation in Russia with that 
in the US (e.g. pointing to the use of death penalty). The main goal of it is to give an 
impression of Western hypocrisy and double standards to delegitimise its claim to moral 
authority (Headley 2015).  Russian media has also relied on various conspiracy theories 
to foster distrust in the official versions of the mainstream media (Yablokov 2015). 
“Conspiracy theories serve RT’s counterhegemonic agenda by functioning as a ‘weapons 
of the weak’ against the Western socio-political order, and thus draw audiences who are 
already distrustful of this ‘global machine of control’” (Richter 2017, 13).  
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3. Empirical part 
In this chapter the author will first present the methodology of the thesis. The author will 
then move on to conduct a discourse analysis on the coverage of Sputnik and RT to find 
out the specific strategic narratives broadcasted by the Russian media during the Catalan 
crisis. By imagining that the nodal points are interrelated to each other in imaginary chains 
of equivalence, six different sets of nodal points were identified. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion linking the empirical part with the theoretical framework. 
3.1. Methodology 
The author conducted a poststructuralist discourse analysis on the content of Sputnik and 
RT to identify the strategic narratives that Russia projected in regard to the Catalan 
referendum.  
Miskimmon et al. (2003, 16) rely on the use of poststructuralist studies of discourse in 
international relations. They argue that the way discourses function in international 
relations, and the way these could be used in analysing narrative contestation rests on 
three main premises. First, the fact that discourses are never quite fixed for they produce 
power relations and there would always be some groups with the intent of challenging the 
discourse. Second, Miskimmon et al. (2003, 17) contend that “discourses give meaning 
to material objects and institutions that then become anchors of those discourses”. Third, 
discourses create subject positions that are filled with different actors, creating in- and 
out-groups with competing identities and interests. Overall then, the unfixity of 
discourses, the meaning-making process and the creation of different identity groups all 
create politics. “Political leaders then step in to craft these discourses into narratives. If 
the raw materials of narrative produce political differences and struggles, then so too will 
the narratives formed from them. Hence, the very stuff of narratives, their ontological 
foundations, make political contestation inevitable.” (Miskimmon et al. 2003, 17) 
Narratives feature a sense of movement, a causal transformation, a before and an after, 
that distinguishes them from discourses. Miskimmon et al. (2003, 7) understand 
discourses as almost static blocks, the raw material for communication, that are used to 
construct narratives from. “Actors can only form and project a narrative based upon the 
discourse available to them in their historical situation, so discourses have a structuring 
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effect upon narrative action.” Actors use discourses to craft narratives with the aim to 
influence others’ behaviour and opinions (Miskimmon et al. 2003, 7). 
The main tenet of the discourse analytical approaches that derive from structuralist and 
poststructuralist linguistic philosophy is that our access to reality is always through 
language. It is through language that representations of reality are created (Jørgensen and 
Phillips 2002, 9). This does not mean though that reality is not real. Although a stone can 
be both understood as a projectile or as an object of aesthetic contemplation, it is still the 
same physical object (Torfing 1999, 94). 
Another key pillar of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory is that these can never be quite fixed 
for the language is fundamentally instable. “Different discourses – each of them 
representing particular ways of talking about and understanding the social world – are 
engaged in a constant struggle with one other to achieve hegemony, that is, to fix the 
meanings of language in their own way.” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 6–7). 
Discourses are then involved in a never-ending fixation process within a field of 
discursivity (everything that is outside of the discourse). It is in these drifting relations 
with each other that discourses attempt to construct a more stable (partially fixed) centre 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 112; Andersen 2003, 51). Torfing (1999, 98) explains that 
“every discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity by 
expanding signifying chains which partially fix the meaning of the floating signifier”. 
These privileged signifiers capable of assigning meaning to other signifiers in the chain 
of signification are the nodal points (points de capitons) (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 112; 
Torfing 1999, 98). Through these other signs are ordered and get their meaning from. 
(Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 26).  
Meanings of floating signifiers are fixed within a paradigmatic chain of equivalence. “The 
more predominant the logic of equivalence is, the stronger and the more important 
becomes the particular social antagonism for the structuration of the social. Thus, the 
infinite expansion of a chain of equivalence tends to establish a clear-cut political frontier 
which divides the discursive space into two camps: friends and enemies” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 1985, 131; Torfing 1999, 126). Although the attempt by socialist forces to 
construct the proletariat as the equivalence of the people has failed, it was successful to 
confront one set of equivalences (the people) with another (the white imperialists) in the 
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anticolonial struggles in the Third World. Other types of popular antagonisms could be 
the polluters vs. the environmentalists, white vs black, patriarchal structures vs feminists 
etc. (Torfing 1999, 127). 
In studying the projection of Russian strategic narratives through the coverage of Sputnik 
and RT, the author identifies the different nodal points of the pro-Russian discourse in 
the articles and videos, and focuses on ascertaining how the pro-Russian discourse is 
constructed on the basis of imagining that the nodal points are interrelated to each other 
in imaginary chains of equivalence (e.g. relating the government of Mariano Rajoy to the 
fascist government imposing repression).  
As the Catalan referendum took place 1 October, a time period from 1 September 2017 
to 31 October 2017 (a month before and after) was chosen for the analysis to get an 
adequate view of the Russian media coverage. The author used Sputniknews archive 
(sputniknews.com/archive) to identify all the articles that related to Catalonia on that 
period. For the coverage of RT, identifying the relevant articles was a more cumbersome 
process for there exists no such archive. Instead, the author used RT search option 
(rt.com/search) using the keywords of “Catalonia”, “Catalan”, “Barcelona”, “Madrid”, 
“Spain”, “referendum” and “independence”. In order to get a more complete view of the 
Russian media coverage, Catalan-related videos published in RT’s Youtube channel were 
also studied. Due to the limitations put on the bachelor’s thesis, the pictorial material 
published by Sputnik and RT was not studied, nor did the author examine any radio or 
television shows.  
Overall, a total of 257 articles were published in Sputnik between 1 September and 31 
October, compared to 165 articles in RT portal. In addition, 51 videos were analysed from 
English-language RT’s Youtube channel (see Appendix 1). About 40% of all the articles 
were published in the period of 25 September – 6 October, i.e. a week before and after 
the referendum. 
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3.2. Discourse analysis 
3.2.1. Madrid’s repressive measures and the ghosts of General Franco  
The events surrounding the Catalan referendum in September and October 2017 were 
unprecedented on many levels: mass protests, arrests of Catalan officials, confiscations 
of referendum materials and the eventual violence that erupted on 1 October (Appendix 
2). According to the Catalan authorities, a total of 844 people requested the services of 
the Catalan emergency health service on 1 October (Rodriquez and Congostrina 2017). 
Four people were hospitalized, including one man losing the vision of an eye due to a 
rubber ball, the rest suffered mainly minor injuries (RTVEs 2017). On the other side 111 
Guardia Civil (Spanish law enforcement) agents were injured (Serra 2018). 
Staying neutral and finding the right balance to cover these events is certainly difficult, it 
should be kept in mind that both Spain and Catalonia have legitimate interests (rule of 
law vs freedom of expression) that influence their behaviour. When examining the 
coverage of Sputnik and RT this was not the case. The coverage was clearly biased in 
favouring the arguments put forth by the independence supporters and discarded the 
arguments of the Spanish government. For example, there were no pro-unity voices 
covered in RT in September apart from citing Spanish officials such as Spain’s state 
prosecutor or members of the government (e.g. RT 21.09.2017; Sputnik 26.09.2017) 
whereas opinion leaders with pro-independence agenda were rife (Appendix 3). The 
narratives that dominated were mainly focused on the authoritarian nature of the Spanish 
government and the legitimate rights of the independence supporters.  
When the violence erupted in 1 October, Sputnik and RT were quick to make the most of 
it, publishing numerous videos that showed the clashes between the Guardia Civil and the 
independence supporters. Some of the most brutal videos included Guardia Civil 
attacking protesters, kicking people on ground or tearing crying women from their hair 
(e.g. RT 1.10.2017a; RT 1.10.2017b). While it is expected and normal of the media to 
cover the police brutalities extensively and question whether the use of force was indeed 
proportional, Sputnik and RT went even further, editing some of the videos to amplify 
their emotional effect (e.g. Sputnik 1.10.2017a; RT 27.10.2017). For example, in a news 
broadcast in RT published on 10.10 (RT 10.10.2017a) Hollywood-like action soundtrack 
was put on the background and the police violence was showed in slow motion to stress 
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the use of various weapons e.g. police batons and riot shotguns. The video then continued 
with showing some of the injuries that people suffered such as rubber bullet marks on 
their bodies. It is possible that the video was edited to an extent for the shots looked 
unusually cold in colours.  
Other means were also used to play on the emotions of the viewers. A news broadcast on 
RT on 1 October 2017 (the day of the referendum and clashes) commenced with Spanish 
prime minister Mariano Rajoy thanking the security apparatus and the police forces for 
“carrying out their duty and the mandate they received from the authorities” (RT 
1.10.2017c). Although it can be heard that the tone Rajoy used was rather normal and 
modest, the narrator of RT made it sound otherwise, using quite an aggressive tone that 
made the whole speech look rather ominous. Another video of interest was a broadcast 
on RT the day after Spanish police stormed and occupied several Catalan ministries and 
arrested officials) (RT 21.09.2017). Rajoy was narrated by the same man who again made 
the prime minister sound ominous and malicious. What was more interesting was the RT 
news presenter Nikki Aaron who narrated the news story emotionally, downplaying the 
arguments put forth by the authorities in Madrid1, therefore clearly siding with the 
independence supporters. 
Apart from relying on journalistic sources, social media content was also integrated into 
the articles, such as pictures and videos posted on Twitter (Sputnik 1.10.2017b; RT 
20.09.2017). Although mediating social media enabled Sputnik and RT to generate more 
content it also lowered the threshold of verification whether the videos provided were 
indeed authentic. The Spanish foreign minister Alfonso Dastis has later claimed that some 
of the pictures of the clashes that circulated on the internet were fake (BBC 2017a). Since 
it is not the focus of this thesis, it is unknown to the author whether there were any fake 
pictures or videos provided by Sputnik or RT. 
In addition to amplifying the events in Catalonia in form, Sputnik and RT also increased 
the consequences of the events substantively. As the overwhelming majority of experts 
and opinion leaders who were given time and space in Russian media were pro-
independence leaning (see Appendix 3), narratives critical of the Madrid government 
                                                          
1 The most vivid example is 3.55 when she condemningly exclaims that Madrid has declared the 
upcoming vote “illegal!”.  
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dominated. Some of the nodal points of the pro-Russian discourse identified for example 
included Madrid as authoritarian and repressive, democracy in Spain deteriorating, 
Madrid’s actions as coup d’état, police violence. There were plenty of articles, including 
one opinion piece, published where the actions taken by the Madrid government were 
juxtaposed to those of the Franco regime.2 In two of the videos published in RT’s news 
channel titled “Spanish nationalist protesters give Nazi salute during rally against 
Catalonian independence” (RT 30.09.2017a) and “'Viva Espana!': Fascist salutes seen at 
pro-Spanish unity demos in Barcelona” (RT 8.10.2017a), far-right protesters were shown 
giving Nazi salutes in pro-unity/anti-independence rallies in Madrid and Barcelona. 
Although these far-right activists were small in numbers compared to the overall 
participation in the rally, this was not mentioned. 
One of the features of Sputnik and RT’s coverage was also the use of Julian Assange as 
the principal international commentator for the events unfolding in Catalonia. Assange is 
known to be a tool of Russian information activity, having previously also appeared on 
RT (European Parliament 2016, 6). He is also a vocal supporter of Catalan independence. 
An article in Sputnik featured four different tweets from Assange comparing the situation 
in Catalonia to world’s first internet war. He argued that what was happening in Catalonia 
can be described as the most significant Western conflict between people state since the 
fall of the Berlin wall (Sputnik 30.09.2017). The same article was also published in RT, 
featuring tweets from Edward Snowden (RT 30.09.2017b). Julian Assange’s tweets were 
cited altogether in 10 articles.3  Assange was also frequently covered in Spanish-language 
Sputnik. According to the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, between 11 
and 27 September, headlines in Spanish-language Sputnik gave Assange more 
prominence than either the President of Catalonia Carles Puigdemont or Spanish prime 
minister Mariano Rajoy (DFRLab 2017). 
                                                          
2 Some of the relevant news headlines: “‘Has Spain reverted to Franco-style military dictatorship?“ (RT 
2.10.2017a), “Catalonia Standoff: Spanish Constitution, 'Sons of Francoists' vs Independence“ (Sputnik 
2.10.2017), “Jail and execution: Madrid makes veiled threat to Catalan leader by raising predecessor’s 
fate“ (RT 10.10.2017a), “Invoking Article 155 Is 'Worst Attack' on Catalonia in Centuries“ (Sputnik 
21.10.2017), “Catalan crisis escalated by repressive actions of Spanish government – analysts” (RT 
22.10.2017). 
3 RT 17.09.2017; RT 1.10.2017d; RT 16.10.2017; RT 17.10.2017a; Sputnik 1.10.2017c; Sputnik 
1.10.2017d; Sputnik 11.10.2017a; Sputnik 11.10.2017b. 
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3.2.2. A dream of independence supported by the masses 
Apart from amplifying the violence and presenting the government in Madrid as 
repressive, one of the key features of the coverage of English-language Sputnik and RT 
was that most of the articles were either neutral or biased towards the pro-independence 
camp. This is exemplified by the fact that only 12 opinion leaders (people that Sputnik 
and RT asked opinion from) out of 85 argued against the independence.4 
The people that gave their opinion to Sputnik or RT belonged mostly to two different 
groups: they were either academics/political commentators or politicians (Appendix 3). 
The politicians interviewed came overwhelmingly from three backgrounds: they were 
either politicians from non-mainstream/fringe parties, Europeans with separatist 
aspirations, or pro-independence Catalans (Appendix 3). The use of predominantly pro-
independence or separatist-leaning opinion leaders was also reflected in the overall 
coverage of Sputnik and RT with narratives such as “democratic rights of the Catalans”, 
“attack on democracy”, “will of people” or “freedom of expression” dominating. It was 
oftentimes argued that the referendum was not about achieving independence or self-
determination but in fact about democracy – about making one’s voice heard. 
The coverage of Sputnik and RT intended to arouse feelings of sympathy towards the pro-
independence supporters. Sputnik and RT made it look like a conflict between pro-
independence Catalans with legitimate concerns and right to self-determination, and anti-
independence Spanish forcing the abstract-sounding rule of law and constitution on the 
Catalans. This mindset was encouraged by the way Sputnik and RT associated itself 
emotionally with the pro-independence Catalans. The news channels mostly presented 
the stories from Catalan standpoint. Pro-independence rallies were much more 
extensively broadcast with pictures of young and old people in a happy mood, Catalans 
singing together the national anthem, concerts taking place etc. The reporters were 
oftentimes in the midst of the crowds making street interviews, asking people of their 
opinion and emotions regarding the referendum.  
                                                          
4 This does not necessarily mean that all the other opinion leaders were pro-independence. In fact, many 
of the opinions presented were either neutral or addressing different questions (such as narratives 
accusing EU of hypocrisy).   
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The pro-unity rallies, on the other hand, were usually mentioned casually, although the 
opinion polls showed that support against the independence was higher than for the 
independence.5 There were no street interviews, no pictures of the children or the old – 
rather, if there was any coverage it tended to be negative, showing the pro-unity 
supporters as rowdy, nationalist and violent. One of the videos commenced with showing 
the rowdy Spaniards burning flares, tearing and burning the Catalan flags and spitting 
towards the camera, then continuing to cover the peaceful students protest at the 
University of Barcelona (RT 23.09.2017). Another example of media associating 
themselves with the independence supporters is video (RT 6.10.2017) that showed the 
reporter standing in the midst of independence supporters, “a peaceful march, hundreds 
of people who have come out to speak against the police brutality”. She then pointed her 
finger to show that there were also pro-unity protesters across the street and police in 
between them “to avoid any kinds of trouble”, leaving the viewer the impression that if 
there were to be trouble, it would be initiated by the pro-unity supporters. 
As there were practically no pro-unity opinion leaders interviewed and no coverage of 
the opinions of average pro-unity supporters (although the majority according to the 
opinion polls), the dominant way pro-independence and anti-repression arguments were 
countered was through the central government in Madrid. Madrid’s government was 
mostly either referred to impersonally or embodied by the police forces or by Prime 
Minister Mariano Rajoy. Deputy Prime Minister Soraya Sáenz de Santamaria6, Foreign 
Minister Alfonso Dastis and Attorney General Jose Manuel Maza were also mentioned. 
Madrid’s arguments were oftentimes given in an official form, referencing and citing 
press releases or broadcasting short clips of speeches from the press conferences. This 
meant that the emotionally charged viewpoints of the people and of the opinion leaders 
often clashed with the politically correct and tedious-sounding arguments (such as 
constitutionality, need to restore law and order) put forth by the Spanish elite, presenting 
                                                          
5 A survey conducted in June showed that independence was supported by 41% of Catalans whereas 49% 
opposed it (Cerulus 2017). Two polls published by El Pais in the end of October showed the support for 
independence 33.5% and 29% respectively (Trujillo and Toyer 2017). 
6 On 27 October Santamaria was given the task of overseeing the functions of the Generalitat of Catalonia 
after PM Rajoy dismissed President of the Generalitat of Catalonia Carles Puigdemont. 
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the pro-unity camp as “others” – distant and alien both to the pro-independence Catalans 
but also to the audience of Sputnik and RT.  
Apart from narrating the events largely from the pro-independence standpoint, Sputnik 
and RT sometimes also showed their bias by distorting important information and even 
lying. This was exemplified by the fact that although it was repeatedly stated in October 
that about 90% of the people had voted in favour of independence, the majority of the 
time RT (but also Sputnik) failed to mention the turnout figures which due to the boycott 
of unity supporters were as low as 43% (and therefore questioned the legitimacy of the 
referendum). RT also neglected the turnout figures in the previous referendum held in 
2014, which were 41% (Jackson, 2014), thus presenting the audience a picture of a 
popular movement of Catalans who have long sought independence from Spain. The 
same kind of distortion of facts was also evident in the RT coverage of the declaration of 
independence by the Catalan government on 27 October (RT, 27.10.2017a; RT, 
27.10.2017b; RT, 27.10.2017c) when RT broadcasted a narrative that 72 MPs had voted 
in favour in independence, 10 against, and only two had abstained. Although presenting 
it as an overwhelming victory for the independence supporters, RT neglected the fact that 
out of the 135 MPs, 53 MPs (the lawmakers from the pro-unity parties) had in fact left 
the chamber minutes prior to the vote to boycott it. Thus, the resolution had actually been 
passed by only 70 MPs out of 135 MPs. Sputnik was more objective in their coverage, 
mentioning the boycott in the majority of articles. 
Apart from neglecting important pieces of information, outright lies were also broadcast 
by RT on one of the occasions. In a news broadcast of mid-September (RT 16.09.2017) 
the news presenter argued that the independence is not actually wanted by not so few as 
“according to numerous polls, 80% of the people will be voting in favour of 
independence”. Anna Arqué, a pro-independence activist also added that “the majority of 
the members of the Catalan parliament are in favour of independence”. Apart from 
presenting these arguments, the broadcast mainly addressed the question of deterioration 
of democracy in Spain. 
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3.2.3. Criticism of the independence movement and the Russian position 
The coverage of Sputnik and RT was not completely one-sided as there were also some 
opinion leaders, 12 out of 85, who hold critical views towards the Catalan independence, 
some of them arguing for the supremacy of the Spanish constitution, others were critical 
towards the legitimacy of the referendum in light of the low turnout (43% due to the 
boycott of unity supporters). A majority of these viewpoints were published in the second 
half of October.   
One of the most critical articles in Sputnik (Start 19.10.2017) was an interview with 
Carlos Flores Juberias, a constitutional law professor at the University of Valencia, who 
argued that what Spain is actually doing by dismissing the Catalan government is 
preserving national unity and supremacy of law and defending the rights of its citizens 
against the authoritarian government in Barcelona: “[In the illegal referendum] the votes 
were counted by the Catalan government, with absolutely no independent supervision, 
with no judicial control, no international intervention. The result was two million in favor 
of independence, which is less than half of the electorate. This has not stopped 
Puigdemont from pursuing independence, even though he has the Constitution, the courts, 
the institutions, and most of the Spanish and Catalan citizens against it.” 
The pro-unity voices and arguments were getting somewhat more space in Sputnik and 
RT in October as the situation in Catalonia evolved. In addition to the opinion pieces that 
were critical of independence, the nature of the broadcast of Sputnik and RT also changed. 
Rajoy’s voice was not narrated as ominous as aggressive anymore, there was even a video 
(RT 21.10.2017) featuring a modest female voice narrating Rahoy. A street interview 
from one of the pro-unity marches was also broadcast in RT in the end of October (RT 
30.10.2017). On 17 October an article titled “Are Catalonian nationalists copying 
Maidan's ‘propaganda’ handbook? (VIDEOS)” was published in RT comparing the video 
promoting Catalan independence with that of the 2014 Maidan protests in Ukraine (RT 
17.10.2017b). On 8.10 Daniel Hoegger, senior policy fellow at the Swiss-based think tank 
Forum on Foreign Policy argued that Catalan independence is not relatable to that of 
Kosovo (RT 8.10.2017b). 
An interesting feature of RT’s broadcast in October was that it began to ridicule the 
President of Catalonia Carles Puigdemont. Two of the videoclips (RT 10.10.2017b; RT 
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11.10.2017) featured shots of Puigdemont in the Catalan Assembly suspending the 
referendum with a silly-sounding music in the background. The third one (RT 
27.10.2017d) criticised the fact that three weeks after the referendum Catalan 
independence was still under question with Puigdemont having left the final decision to 
the Catalan parliament. A Twitter video was shown that featured a tiny Puigdemont 
(called “tiny-mont”) doing a silly dance. Critical tweets of him then followed.  
The pro-independence bias in Sputnik and RT was actually contrary to the Russian 
official position regarding the events in Catalonia which viewed the developments in 
Catalonia as the internal affair of Spain that should be solved “in strict compliance with 
Spanish law, in the interests of a united and prosperous Kingdom of Spain and with due 
respect for the rights and freedoms of all Spanish citizens” (MFA of Russia 2017). 
Russian viewpoint on the issue was brought out only a couple of times in the time period 
whereas the pro-unity positions of various Western countries (including NATO) were 
often mentioned. In one of the articles (Sputnik 27.10.2017a) that featured a live feed of 
different countries responding to the independence declaration of Catalan parliament, 
Russian position was clearly hidden from the audience with Russian FM spokesperson 
only noting that Russian “position on the issue has been consistent, and it has not changed. 
It has been repeatedly posted on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website.” 
3.2.4. The hypocrisy and double standards of the European Union 
Apart from the Sputnik and RT’s coverage of the tensions between Barcelona and Madrid 
there was another storyline that got a lot of attention –  that of the European Union’s. The 
coverage of the European Union’s role in the crisis (or rather, its inactivity) was rather 
latent at first but gained more traction as the events unfolded. Throughout the coverage 
in September and October Sputnik and RT put special emphasis on the need of the 
international community (especially the EU) to step in and mediate the conflict between 
Barcelona and Madrid (e.g. Sputnik 3.10.2017; Sputnik 5.10.2017). 
First appeals for the EU to step in and act came already before the referendum on 28 
September as Madrid was stepping up its measures to foil the referendum by arresting 
officials, sending in extra police and seizing ballot papers. The Catalan Foreign Affairs 
Chief Raül Romeva argued that the EU should respond to Spain’s harassment of civil 
rights organisations and journalists and it was “the EU’s duty as a repository of 
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democratic values to put pressure on Madrid to allow the plebiscite” (Sputnik 
28.09.2017a; RT 28.09.2017a) In addition, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont accused 
the EU of “turning its back” on the repressions unfolding in Catalonia (RT 28.09.2017b). 
These views and calls for action were widely published and broadcasted.  
The calls for action grew considerably stronger on the referendum day as there were 
violent confrontations between Guardia Civil and the independence supporters. An article 
published on 1 October (RT 1.10.2017d) concentrated on a tweet by Julian Assange 
urging the European Commission to strip Spain of the rights of an EU member state by 
activating article 7 of the Lisbon treaty. The article then continued with the opinion of 
Greek MEP Stelios Kouloglou who thought the EU should interfere and mediate the 
conflict. Apart from the various Catalan pro-independence politicians, similar opinions 
were also shared by for example Marco Zanni, an Italian MEP from the Five Star 
Movement (Sputnik 3.10.2017a), Michaël Modrikamen, president of the Belgian 
People’s Party7 (Sputnik 3.10.2017b), and various other opinion leaders. 
As it became clear that the EU is not acting in Spain, articles blaming the EU for not 
interfering and accusing EU of hypocrisy began to crop up. “Had this happened in the 
Middle East or in South America or if this happened in some of the new member states, 
we would have EU members and leaders lining up with the most vicious words of 
condemnation,” Matt Carthy, Sinn Féin MEP said in an interview (RT 3.10.2017).8 The 
coverage also accused EU of double standards when dealing with independence 
movements (e.g. Malic, 30.10.2017; RT 1.10.2017d). In a widely referenced article (RT 
2.10.2017b), the Serbian president draw parallels with Kosovo: “How come that in the 
case of Catalonia the referendum on independence is not valid, while in the case of 
Kosovo secession is allowed even without a referendum.” In another article headlined 
“Why isn’t NATO bombing Madrid for 78 days? – former British diplomat” (RT 
4.10.2017) Marko Gašič had an answer to that question: “"I believe the EU would behave 
                                                          
7 A eurospectic, Russia-friendly right-wing populist Belgian unionist party with one member in the 
Belgian Chamber of Representatives.  They received 1,5% of the votes in the last general elections.  
8 Similar views of hypocrisy were also shared by Lorenzo Consoli (RT 28.09.2017c), Stelios Kouloulou 
(RT 1.10.2017d), Ray Finch (RT 3.10.2017), Polly Boiko (RT 18.10.2017), Bart Claes (Sputnik 
12.10.2017), John Wight (Wight 2.10.2017), Nebojsa Malic (Malic, 30.10.2017), Marco Bassani (RT 
23.10.2017), Jonathan Davis (Sputnik 27.10.2017b), Alfred De Zayas (Sputnik 27.10.2017c). 
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in exactly the same way again because [Kosovo] is not an area that belongs to the club, 
the rich man’s club, as Spain does.” 
The most authoritative comment (RT 19.10.2017) criticising EU of its double standards 
featured Vladimir Putin’s speech at Valdai Discussion Club on 19 October. Putin argued 
that the situation in Catalonia should not have come as a surprise since it was EU’s 
unanimous support for Kosovo that had been the turning point that bolstered separatist 
sentiments in Europe. “It turns out that in the eyes of some of our colleagues, there are 
legitimate fighters for independence and freedom, and then there are separatists, who 
cannot defend their rights even through democratic procedures,” he said (ibid.).9 
3.2.5. The European Union responsible for the crisis 
European Union’s inactivity and hypocrisy towards the Catalan crisis led to conclusions 
that the EU has lost its credibility as the warden of democratic rights, as it so self-
describes. This opinion was shared by two of the most frequent columnists in Sputnik and 
RT, John Wight and Steve Keen10. Wight argued that “the EU also bears responsibility 
for any potential violence, as it showed unanimous support to the Spanish government’s 
actions” (RT 27.10.2017e). Keen added that the EU has basically aligned itself with 
authoritarian tendencies in its own member states (Sputnik 27.10.2017d).  
There were many explanations provided for the cause of Catalan crisis. While these 
explanations rest their claims on different if not opposite ideological foundations, a 
distinct characteristic that united them was the antagonism and criticism of the EU. John 
Wight (Wight 11.10.2017) for example saw neoliberalism, expressed in the “draconian” 
austerity measures following the 2008 economic crisis, as the main cause for both the 
activation of the Catalan independence movement, but also for Brexit and the spread of 
various nationalist and Eurosceptic parties. Jonathan Davis (Sputnik 27.10.2017b), on the 
other hand, viewed the encroaching socialism and government intervention that followed 
the 2008 economic crisis, as the root of evil. “The reason why Catalonia wants to leave 
Spain, [...], is exactly the reason [...] why the Americans voted for Trump, because the 
                                                          
9 The Valdai Discussion Club is a Moscow-based think tank. Putin has participated in its meetings each 
year. Daniel Drezner (2016) has described Valdai as “the highest-profile Russian equivalent to Davos.” 
Full speech available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_5rAikrZUo.  
10 John Wight had a total of 6 appearances in Sputnik and RT in September and October. Steve Keen’s 
articles were published on 3 occasions. For more, see Appendix 3. 
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people are fed up with what governments and socialists are doing to us. [...] It's the elite 
against everyone else and that is why. [...] The people are finally waking up.” 
Marco Zanni (Sputnik 3.10.2017a) and Karel Vereycken11 suggested the Catalan crisis 
would have a positive effect in the eyes of some Eurocrats, allowing the EU to become 
even more centralised and undemocratic. In “Why Catalan Independence Vote Part of 
Broader Plan to Split Europe Up” (Blinova 6.10.2017), Vereycken argued that Brussels 
is in fact supporting the idea of Spain’s disintegration for it would be easier for the EU to 
manage small entities rather than big nation-states. “For the hardcore Europeanists the 
large historical nation-states of Europe have to be broken up into smaller entities of about 
5 to 8 million inhabitants [e.g. Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders] in order to get the European 
population into accepting a EU empire-like supranational super state,” he pointed out. 
Steve Keen saw a more explicit link between the Catalan crisis and the EU, arguing that 
EU’s economic failures, especially the Euro, are to blame for separatist movements across 
Southern Europe. “Catalans blame Madrid for their economic malaise. But the real 
culprits are in Brussels, Frankfurt, and Berlin” (Keen 31.10.2017). He argued that the 
Eurozone is effectively generating inequality among its member states as there is no 
treasury and no way of equalising the impact of trade balances (Sputnik 27.10.2017d). 
This inequality leads to more tensions and economic deprivation in some countries, 
exemplified for example by the high unemployment rates in Spain and Greece12, thus 
prompting the desire for secession (Sputnik 24.10.2017).  
The clearest links between the EU and the Catalan crisis were provided by David Coburn 
(RT 27.10.2017a), UKIP MEP from Scotland, who noted that people are disheartened by 
the fact that the decision-making has been taken away from their hands. Instead of 
Madrid, he argued, Catalans should be angry of the EU: “All the decisions they think are 
made in Madrid, [...], they’re made in Brussels. Madrid does what Brussels tells them.” 
As Madrid is only a rubber stamp for Brussels, the question of whether to leave Spain is 
secondary: “If Catalans want some kind of change they have to get out of Europe as well.” 
                                                          
11 Marco Zanni is an Italian MEP from M5S, Karel French is the Vice President of the French Solidarité 
and Progrès party that advocates Euroscepticism, protectionism and anti-imperialism. The party is not 
represented in the parliament. 
12 The rate of unemployment for Spain was 16,7% in October 2017, youth unemployment was 38,2% 
(Eurostat 2017a). The corresponding figures for Greece were 20,7% and 40,2% (Eurostat 2017b). 
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3.2.6. Disintegration of Europe 
Together with questions of what caused the Catalan referendum there were also 
discussions and opinions on what the future of Europe in general would look like if 
Catalonia were to split from Spain. Most of the opinion leaders in Sputnik and RT had a 
negative outlook to it. Dr. Russell Foster, for example, argued that the possible breakaway 
of Catalonia, one of the most economically powerful regions in Spain, would have 
catastrophic consequences for Spain and lead to the biggest disaster for Europe since the 
World War II (Sputnik 6.10.2017a). Marco Bassani thought (RT 23.10.2017) the 
independence would cause a domino effect with long-lasting consequences: 
“I think we’re witnessing the disintegration of this kind of European order. There will be 
a confederation in Europe clearly in like 10–15 years from now, but not based on the 
nation-states that we know. If Catalonia and Spain break apart, then a lot of things will 
happen. That will have definitely a domino effect with Veneto, Scotland and all sorts of 
other regions. There might be easily 35 to 45 new countries coming up.” 
One of the key features of Sputnik and RT’s coverage in October was their keen interest 
towards other secessionist movements in Europe. The possible “domino effect” was 
addressed in about 20 articles, covering secessionist movements in Åland (Sputnik 
10.10.2017), Balearic Islands (Sputnik 28.09.2017b), Bavaria (Sputnik 6.10.2017b), 
Brittany (RT 1.10.2017e), Canvey Island (Sputnik 16.10.2017), Flanders, Lombardy, 
Veneto, Scotland, Yorkshire and Wales (Sputnik 27.09.2017). Some of this coverage was 
exaggerated, featuring interviews with pro-independence parties without mentioning that 
these parties only possess marginal levels of support among the population. This could 
leave the readers with the impression these secessionist movements are much more 
serious than they actually are. Some of the examples would include the leader of Future 
of Åland party in “Catalonian Referendum Sparks Separatist Hopes on Finnish 
Archipelago” (Sputnik 10.10.2017), leader of the Yorkshire Party in “Forget Catalonia – 
Yorkshire wants independence! UK Parliament to debate new devolution” (RT 
10.10.2017c) and chairman of the Bavarian Party in “German 'Catalonia'? Prospects of 
Independence Referendum Scenario in Bavaria” (Sputnik 6.10.2017b).13 
                                                          
13 Future of Åland party got 7,4% of the votes in the 2015 Åland parlament elections (JCI 2017). 
Yorkshire Party got 3,8% in Rotherham constituency in 2017 UK general election (BBCc 2017). 
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3.3. Discussion 
The tense atmosphere in Catalonia between the independence supporters and unity 
supporters that was aggravated by Madrid’s firm crackdown of the Catalan referendum 
on 1 October provided a fertile ground for the Russian media to use it for their advantage 
and narrate a story in line with the overall Russian strategic aspirations in the world. The 
aim of this thesis was to identify and assess these strategic narratives Russia disseminated 
in relation to the Catalan crisis. In order to do that, media coverage of the referendum by 
Russian government sponsored news outlets Sputnik and RT was examined. Based on the 
analysis three main strategic narratives of policy, identity and system were identified: 
1) the policy narrative arguing that the EU should act to defend the legitimate rights 
of the Catalans against Spain’s repressive measures, 
2) the identity narrative depicting the EU as hypocritical in its stance towards the 
crisis and also partly responsible for it, 
3) the system narrative contending that the EU is in decline and might even 
disintegrate due to various separatist movements that gain in popularity. 
The basis for all these narratives was laid by the overamplification of the conflict and 
different depiction of the pro-independence and pro-unity supporters. The carefully 
chosen opinion leaders ensured that the overall coverage of Sputnik and RT was biased 
towards the independence supporters. Pro-unity – or rather, “pro-repression” – camp was 
mostly embodied by the bureaucrats – the elite – in Madrid, e.g. prime minister Mariano 
Rajoy, or the police forces, their opinions were concise and politically correct. Measures 
taken by Madrid were shown as inappropriate for a democratic country. Furthermore, 
Madrid’s violent crackdown even brought about comparisons with the regime of 
Francisco Franco. Apart from the content, bias was also reflected in the form of the 
coverage that had the effect of amplifying emotions.  Pro-independence supporters on the 
other hand were shown as average people from the streets, of different socioeconomic 
backgrounds, united in a common noble cause of self-determination and disheartened by 
the fact that they’re not even allowed the basic freedom of expression, so fundamental to 
a democratic country.  
                                                          
Bavarian Party got 0.8% of the votes in 2017 German federal elections (The Federal Returning Officer 
2017). 
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Sputnik and RT’s coverage thus created this imaginary link of nodal points that aimed to 
simplify the social (discursive) space by dividing it into two opposing camps – “us” vs 
“them”, elite vs popular will, repressors and the repressed – creating a type of popular 
antagonism foreseen by Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 131).  This logic of “us” vs “them” 
was also carried over to the coverage of the EU when the union was accused of being 
responsible for all the decisions that Madrid had made. This left the impression that 
instead of Madrid, Eurocrats in Brussels should be looked at as those who subdue the free 
will of the people. 
As Madrid was using repressive measures to oppress the peaceful Catalans standing for 
their right of freedom of expression (according to the Russian narrative), the only logical 
policy narrative of Russia was to encourage the pro-independence supporters to turn to 
the EU, the warden of human rights, to seek for redress and mediation. This would have 
served two purposes. If EU would have agreed to mediate it would have given the crisis 
an international dimension, turning it from a strictly internal affair of Spain into an 
international conflict with Catalonia sitting as an equal to Spain behind the negotiations 
table. This would have been an ideal pretext for Russia to show that the EU is actually 
encouraging separatist movements across Europe.  
Since the EU declined to act and viewed the matter as a Spain’s internal affair another 
window of opportunity opened for Russia to project an identity narrative of the EU as 
hypocritical and following double standards in its treatment of different separatist 
movements. “Why isn’t NATO bombing Madrid for 78 days,” William Mallinson asked 
in RT (RT 4.10.2017) implying that if the EU recognised Kosovo’s independence, it 
should apply the same standards for Catalonia. Russia was thus trying to prove the 
misalignment of EU’s identity narratives (the image it projects of itself) with its policy 
narratives (the actions it actually undertakes) in order to weaken its standing. As 
Miskimmon et al. noted (2017, 8), the system, identity and policy narratives need to be 
in harmony in order to be effective.  
Whilst Russia was accusing the EU of hypocrisy it was at the same time doing its best to 
conceal the fact that the Russian official position regarding the Catalan crisis was in fact 
aligned with that of the EU’s, viewing it as an internal matter of Spain that should be 
solved in “strict compliance with Spanish law” (MFA of Russia 2017). Russian official 
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position was in harmony with its great power narrative that saw the use of force the 
primary way to counter perceived security threats, exemplified by the use of force in 
Chechnya by Vladimir Putin (Roselle 2017, 79).  The official position was touched only 
a few times in the end of October though for a more frequent mentioning of the Russian 
position would have weakened the identity narrative it was disseminating of the EU (EU 
hypocritical for supporting Spain). 
On the macro scale, coverage of the Catalan crisis could be seen in the overall prism of 
Russian contestation of West’s hegemony. The system narrative of Russia told a story of 
Europe in disintegration with numerous separatist movements in its member states 
gaining ground. The overall effect of separatist movements in Europe was amplified by 
Sputnik and RT with the implicit juxtaposition of serious independence movements (e.g. 
Flanders and Scotland) with marginal ones (e.g. Åland, Bavaria, Yorkshire). EU was 
shown in decay in order to weaken its image both in the eyes of its own citizenry but also 
its geopolitical contenders. Russia was thus aiming to shape the perception of the world 
to its own advantage aiming in the long run for a new system alignment of the currently 
Western dominated world, as foreseen by Miskimmon and O’Loughlin (2017, 115–116). 
When examining the Russian media coverage role of the changing media ecology with 
novel ways of engaging public should be duly noted. Although a social media analysis 
fell out of the sphere of interest of this thesis, Sputnik and RT were found to integrate 
user-generated content (primarily Twitter but also Youtube) quite frequently in its 
articles. Some of the articles in Sputnik such as “'Eight Seconds of Freedom': 
#CataloniaIndependence Delay Disappoints Internet” (Sputnik 11.10.2017a) were 
entirely based on tweets by random users. Although Miskimmon et al. (2017, 10) argue 
that a change in the information infrastructure is also accompanied with a change in the 
distribution of power, e.g. allowing for a new ’bottom up’ public diplomacy, this is 
questionable for Russia certainly controls the communication processes taking place in 
its media system, publishing tweets and opinions that are carefully sifted beforehand.  
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Conclusion 
Russian activity outside of its borders has been constantly rising throughout the last 
decade. Although accusations of Russia taking advantage of the Catalan independence 
referendum and interfering in the internal processes of Spain have been rife there has been 
little academic research on Russian information activity in Spain. The author aimed to 
partly fill that gap by examining the news coverage of Russian government sponsored 
English-language media outlets Sputnik and RT.  
The aim of this thesis was to identify the strategic narratives that Russia disseminated to 
the English-language audience in relation to the Catalan independence referendum and 
connect them with Russian foreign policy interests, i.e. the broader Russian understanding 
of how the international system ought to function. The author set a hypothesis that Russia 
was taking advantage of the events in Catalonia to enfeeble the European Union. 
To test the hypothesis, a poststructuralist discourse analysis was conducted on the content 
of Sputnik and RT news coverage. As these media outlets form the foundation of Russian 
international information activities it was assumed that they also embody the overall 
understanding of how Russia perceives the world and its place in it. By imagining that 
the nodal points of the pro-Russian discourse are interrelated in imaginary chains of 
equivalence, the author identified six different sets of nodal points that can be reduced to 
three main Russian strategic narratives, all directed towards the European Union. 
The author discovered that the coverage of Sputnik and RT was clearly biased towards 
the Catalan independence movement with pro-unity arguments either discarded or 
diminished. The use of force shown by the Spanish government was shown as a Francoist 
practice, unworthy of a democratic state, whereas pro-independence supporters were 
shown as average people from the street with legitimate concerns. These stereotypes were 
furthermore amplified with the use of various communicative tools, i.e. showing the 
police violence in slow motion with intense music on the background.  
Policy level. The tense and at times violent conflict in Catalonia gave Russia a pretext to 
furthermore amplify the tensions and ultimately direct the coverage towards the European 
Union. Following the proposition of Miskimmon et al. to divide strategic narratives into 
three categories it was ascertained that on a policy level, Russia argued for the 
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intervention of the European Union. This would have given the conflict a wholly new, 
international dimension.  
Identity level.  As it became clear that the European Union is not willing to step in and 
mediate the conflict, Russia began to accuse the EU of hypocricy and double standards. 
Russia argued that the EU that ought to be the model for other states and regions as the 
epitomiser of European and democratic values does not in fact match its rhetoric. One of 
the main examples was to juxtapose Catalan independence aspirations with that of 
Kosovo’s and draw attention to the fact that while the EU had supported the independence 
of the latter the first now finds itself abandoned by the EU.  
System level. Weakening the perception of the European Union by directing negative 
attention towards it was part of the overall strategy to improve Russian relative standing 
in the world. The coverage valued articles and opinion pieces that showed the EU in decay 
and in the process of disintegration due to numerous separatist movements gaining ground 
in its member states. The coverage could be broadly viewed as an intent to weaken the 
West’s hegemony and by doing this strive for a multilateral world order where the role of 
Russia would be increased. Therefore, the hypothesis that Russia was taking advantage 
of the events in Catalonia to enfeeble the European Union was found to be true. 
At a time when Russia is actively using its foreign policy channels and influence to negate 
any claims of foreign intervention and there are different narratives in the media of how 
one should perceive and comprehend the world it is a duty of the European academic 
society to conduct researches like this. The work contributes to the wider efforts of 
elucidating the range and technique of Russian information activities and demonstrates 
that Russia has vested interest not only in its close neighbourhood but also further away 
where it is not an active player itself. As the goals of Russian information activity might 
then be more difficult to fathom, these efforts might at first sight go unnoticed. 
This thesis only concerned the projection of Russian strategic narratives. To get a full 
understanding of Russian information activities, it should also be analysed how the 
audience of Sputnik and RT received these narratives and what effect did they have on 
the European Union. These analyses should be conducted bearing in mind the 21st 
century media ecosystem where people and international actors increasingly rely on 
social media channels to communicate. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Coverage of Catalonia in Sputnik and RT September – October 2017.  
Publishing 
date (2017) 
Number of 
Sputnik articles 
published 
Number of RT 
articles 
published 
Number of RT 
Youtube videos 
Articles and 
videos in total 
1.09    0 
2.09    0 
3.09    0 
4.09 1   1 
5.09    0 
6.09 2   2 
7.09 4 1  5 
8.09 2   2 
9.09    0 
10.09 1   1 
11.09 2  1 3 
12.09 2 1  3 
13.09 1 1  2 
14.09 3  1 4 
15.09 1 1  2 
16.09 1 1 1 3 
17.09 2 1  3 
18.09 1   1 
19.09 1   1 
20.09 1 3 1 5 
21.09 3 1 1 5 
22.09  1  1 
23.09 1 1  2 
24.09 2   2 
25.09    0 
26.09 2   2 
27.09 3   3 
28.09 5 3 1 9 
29.09 7 1 1 9 
30.09 8 6 1 15 
1.10 29 14 10 53 
2.10 19 13 1 33 
3.10 13 6 1 20 
4.10 9 8 2 19 
5.10 3 4  7 
6.10 14 7 2 23 
7.10 2  1 3 
8.10 3 3 2 8 
9.10 3 3  6 
10.10 9 5 3 17 
11.10 9 9 1 19 
12.10 6 4 2 12 
13.10 3 2  5 
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14.10 2 1  3 
15.10    0 
16.10 6 4 1 11 
17.10 4 4 1 9 
18.10 1 4  5 
19.10 3 2  5 
20.10 4 2  6 
21.10 8 4  12 
22.10 6 5 2 13 
23.10 4 4 1 9 
24.10 2 3 1 6 
25.10 2 4 1 7 
26.10 2 1 1 4 
27.10 16 7 5 28 
28.10 6 5 1 12 
29.10 5 4  9 
30.10 4 5 3 12 
31.10 4 6 1 11 
In total 257 165 51 473 
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Appendix 2. Chronology of the events in Catalonia. 
Date Event Some articles published by RT 
and Sputnik 
 
June 2017 
The Catalan government calls an 
independence referendum for 
October 2017 
 
 
 
7 September 2017 
The Spanish constitutional court 
declares the upcoming 
referendum illegal by suspending 
the referendum law introduced 
by the Catalan regional 
government. 
“Catalan Government Accuses 
Madrid of 'Convert (sic!) Stage of 
Siege'”, “Catalan Referendum 
Violation of Spanish Constitution, 
EU Law - EU Parl't Head“ 
 
15 September 
2017 
Spanish police seize ballot boxes 
hidden by the regional 
government 
“EU Commission Urges Catalonia 
to Respect Spain’s Constitution”, 
“‘We will vote!’ Catalonia officially 
launches independence referendum 
campaign” 
 
 
 
20 September 
2017 
Spanish police storm and occupy 
Catalan government ministries, a 
dozen Catalan officials are 
arrested by Spanish police for 
organizing the independence 
referendum. Protesters take to 
the streets in response 
“Catalan President Accuses Spain of 
Suspending Region's Self-
Governance”, “‘State of siege’: 
Catalan officials, incl. junior 
economy minister, arrested over 
referendum docs” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 October 2017 
Independence referendum. 
Turnout 43%, 92% supporting 
independence. Official numbers 
by the Catalan government show 
that 1066 civilians were injured 
during the clashes with police. 
“Spain's Actions in Catalonia Push 
Country Into Authoritarianism – 
Assange”, “French Bretons rally for 
own self-determination & in 
solidarity with Catalonia”, “Assange 
Urges Juncker to Suspend Spain 
From EU Over Violence in 
Catalonia”, “Madrid’s Violent 
Tactics See Catalan Independence 
Voters Switch Sides”, “Catalan 
Ombudsman Urges Council of 
Europe to Respond to Violence at 
Referendum”, “Catalan police in 
tears as they shield referendum 
voters from Civil Guard”, “Suffer 
for democracy? Police crackdown at 
Barcelona school during 
independence referendum” 
 
 
 
 
3 October 2017 
Huge protests and a general 
strike shake Catalonia as King 
Felipe VI condemns the Catalan 
government in a strongly-worded 
television address 
“EU Should Mediate Madrid-
Catalonia Row Over Independence 
Vote - Belgian Party”, “Belgian 
Interior Minister Says Catalonia's 
Independence Inevitable”, “After 
Catalan crackdown, EU will look 
hypocritical preaching about 
democracy – Irish MEP”, “Viva la 
Independence: Iraqi Kurdistan 
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Backs Catalonia’s Independence 
Aspirations”, “Russia ‘worried 
about Spain,’ hopes Catalan crisis 
will be resolved – Putin” 
 
 
 
 
 
11 October 2017 
Spanish prime minister Mario 
Rajoy sets the Catalan 
government a deadline of 16 
October to clarify whether they 
have declared independence or 
not, with a further three-day 
extension to 19 October. 
“Catalonia Declares Independence, 
Then Dodges a Bullet”, “The Role 
of Neoliberalism in Spain's 
Constitutional Crisis”, “‘Champagne 
stayed in the fridge’: European 
independence movements react to 
Catalan ‘anticlimax’”, “From 'Long 
Live Catalonia' Companys to 
'Follow the People's Will' 
Puigdemont”, “Spanish PM seeks 
clarity on Catalan independence 
declaration, threatens to suspend 
region’s autonomy” 
 
 
17 October 2017 
Spain’s national court orders the 
imprisonment of Jordi Sànchez 
and Jordi Cuixart, two leading 
Catalan separatist politicians. 
“Are Catalonian nationalists 
copying Maidan's ‘propaganda’ 
handbook?”, “Madrid-Catalonia 
Dispute Should Be Settled in 
Spanish Parliament - Ex-PACE 
Head” 
 
 
 
 
21 October 2017 
Spanish government suspends 
Catalonia’s autonomy and forces 
a new election.  
“Domino Effect? Italy's Veneto, 
Lombardy Seek Autonomy After 
Catalan Referendum”, “Invoking 
Article 155 Is 'Worst Attack' on 
Catalonia in Centuries”, “‘It’s a 
coup’: Thousands protest power 
transfer from Barcelona to Madrid”, 
“Catalan leader: Madrid’s steps 
toward direct rule are ‘worst attacks’ 
since Franco’s dictatorship” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 October 2017 
Catalan parliament meets and 
unilaterally declares 
independence by 70 votes to 10, 
in a vote boycotted by the 
opposition. Later that day, 
Spain’s senate approves new 
powers for the Madrid 
government to impose direct rule 
on Catalonia by 214 votes to 47. 
“‘Madrid can only act by force’: 
Spain & Catalonia on a collision 
course”, “EU President Tusk: 
Catalan Independence Vote Changes 
Nothing for Union”, 
“Anticonstitutional, Wrong: World 
Leaders React to Catalan 
Independence”, “'Catalonia Could 
Be Foundation for What Will 
Happen Across the EU' – 
Economist”, “'Rajoy's Intransigence' 
Pushed Catalans 'Fed Up With 
Being Treated Like Kids'”, “EU's 
Economic Failures Are To Blame! – 
Economist On Catalonia's 
Independence”, “Catalan Situation 
'Not a Vanity-Type of Secession, 
Self-Determination'” 
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Appendix 3. Opinion leaders.  
Name Qualification Article Title of the article or video  Available at (accessed 9 May 2018): 
Academics and political commentators 
 
Michele Ainis Italian expert Sputnik, 
10.10.2017 
“Catalonia's Shadow: Why Two 
Italian Regions Seek Autonomy 
Referendums” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710101058096069-italy-veneto-
lombardy-referendums-autonomy/ )  
Chris Bambery 
 
Scottish political analyst, 
previous leading member of 
the International Socialist 
Group, a revolutionary 
socialist organisation 
RT (TV), 
6.10.2017 
“Franco legacy: Crackdown on 
Catalan voters recalls Spanish Civil 
War”  
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
DAQcPf0SnAg  
RT (TV), 
28.10.2017 
“Undivided Attention: Tensions run 
high as Spanish PM dissolves 
Catalan govt”  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_
3aml0quDl4  
Oriol Bartomeus, PhD PhD, professor of political 
science at the Autonomous 
University of Barcelona 
Sputnik, 
30.09.2017 
“Catalonian Referendum: 'Losing 
Barcelona Could Be a Big Problem 
for Spain'” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
09301057838275-catalonia-
referendum-problem-for-spain/  
Marco Bassani 
 
Professor of politics at the 
University of Milan 
RT, 
23.10.2017 
“‘Catalonia likely domino effect – 
up to 45 new counties in Europe’” 
https://www.rt.com/news/407547-
italy-referendum-catalonia-
independence/  
Ferran Brunet, PhD Research fellow with the 
Autonomous University of 
Barcelona 
Sputnik, 
29.09.2017 
“Independent Catalonia: Success or 
Failure?” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
09291057822867-independent-
catalonia-success-or-failure/  
Jordi Pacheso i Canals Catalan political scientist Sputnik, 
27.09.2017 
“Catalonia 'Is Not Against Spain as 
Such, But Against Its Ruling 
Party'”  
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
709271057754075-catalan-
referendum-independence-reasons/  
Lorenzo Codogno 
(presented as Lorenzo 
Cologna) 
Visiting Professor at the 
London School of Economics 
and Political Science, 
European Institute, founder 
Sputnik, 
20.10.2017 
“Italy Sweet-Talks Potential 
Investors With Promises of Higher 
Autonomy”  
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710201058410122-lombardy-veneto-
secession-referendum/ 
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and chief economist at LC 
Macro Advisors  
Gracia Dorel-Ferre 
(presented as Garcia 
Dorel-Ferre) 
Historian and Catalan affairs 
expert 
Sputnik, 
4.10.2017 
“Catalan Independence Vote Risks 
Creating 'Domino Effect' in France”  
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710041057941476-france-catalan-
referendum-consequences/  
Paolo Cossarini 
 
University teacher in politics 
and international relations, 
Loughborough University  
RT (TV), 
16.10.2017 
“Catalonia's response on 
independence is not valid – 
Madrid”  
https://www.rt.com/news/406810-
catalonia-fails-clarify-independence/  
Roberto Duran Professor at the Institute of 
Political Science at the 
Pontifical Catholic University 
of Chile 
Sputnik, 
14.10.2017 
“High Stakes Secession: Catalonia's 
Exorbitant Price to Go It Alone”  
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10141058229045-catalonia-
secession-price/  
Russell Foster, Dr. King’s College London, 
European & International 
Studies Department 
Sputnik, 
6.10.2017 
“Catalonia's Referendum is the 
'Biggest Disaster for Europe Since 
WWII'” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10061058017284-catalonia-
referendum-biggest-disaster-europe/  
Marko Gašić London-based international 
affairs commentator 
RT, 
4.10.2017 
“Why isn’t NATO bombing Madrid 
for 78 days? – former British 
diplomat”  
https://www.rt.com/news/405659-
catalonia-referendum-spain-serbia/ 
RT, 
16.10.2017 
“Catalan quandary: No big national 
power supports its independence – 
analyst” 
https://www.rt.com/news/406872-
catalonia-referendum-spain-
puigdemont/ 
RT (TV), 
16.10.2017 
“Catalonia Countdown: Madrid 
gives Puigdemont until Thursday to 
clarify region's position” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o
gPgMz7BqEM  
Jordi Graupera 
 
Political philosophy professor, 
post-doc researcher at 
Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public and International 
Affairs, Princeton University 
RT (TV), 
28.09.2017 
“Catalan President: EU can’t keep 
ignoring independence referendum”  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
OY5ZQKsY3fE  
Caroline Gray 
 
Lecturer in politics and 
Spanish at Aston University in 
UK 
Sputnik,  
8.10.2017 
“Catalonia to Face Domestic, 
International Obstacles if 
Independence Declared” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710081058053054-catalonia-
independence-referendum/ 
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Modest Guinjoan, Dr.  Economic expert Sputnik, 
29.09.2017 
“Independent Catalonia: Success or 
Failure?” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
09291057822867-independent-
catalonia-success-or-failure/  
Thomas Harrington 
 
Professor of Iberian studies at 
Hartford’s Trinity College 
RT, 
22.10.2017 
“Catalan crisis escalated by 
repressive actions of Spanish 
government – analysts” 
https://www.rt.com/news/407470-
catalonia-repression-spanish-
government/  
Beatriz Hernández 
 
Research fellow at the 
University of Diego Portales in 
Chile 
Sputnik, 
31.10.2017 
“What Happens Next? Four Key 
Questions for Understanding 
Catalonia's Future” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710311058688888-four-key-
questions-catalonia/  
Daniel Hoegger 
 
Senior policy fellow at the 
Swiss-based think tank Forum 
on Foreign Policy 
Sputnik, 
8.10.2017 
“Catalonia to Face Domestic, 
International Obstacles if 
Independence Declared” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710081058053054-catalonia-
independence-referendum/  
Luis Huacuja Mexican expert Sputnik, 
12.10.2017 
“'Let Them Wait More': How 
Catalonia's Crisis Can Be 
Resolved” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710121058169457-catalonia-
independence-government-
negotiations/  
Carlos Flores Juberias 
 
Professor of Constitutional 
Law at the University of 
Valencia 
Sputnik, 
19.10.2017 
“Spanish 'Constitution Superior to 
Catalonia's Autonomous Systems' – 
Academic” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710191058377693-spain-
constitution-catalonia-autonomy/  
Steve Keen 
 
Australian economist and 
author. Professor and Head of 
the School of Economics, 
History and Politics at 
Kingston University, London 
Sputnik, 
24.10.2017 
“Secession Is So Hot Right Now: 
Economist Steve Keen on Where 
the Euro Went Wrong”  
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710241058495323-europe-
economics-independence-
movements/  
Sputnik, 
27.10.2017 
“EU's Economic Failures Are To 
Blame! - Economist On Catalonia's 
Independence” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710271058604018-spain-catalonia-
independence-economy/  
RT, 
31.10.2017 
“Why does Catalonia want to quit 
Spain? It’s the economy, stupid” 
https://www.rt.com/op-ed/408330-
eu-catalonia-economic-separatism/   
Daniel Lacalle 
 
Chief economist at Tressis 
Management, Professor of 
Global Economy at IE 
Business School 
RT (TV), 
8.10.2017 
“Federal police stay, no talks & no 
independent Catalonia – Spanish 
PM” 
https://www.rt.com/news/406022-
catalonia-rajoy-no-talks-police/ 
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Robin McAlpine 
 
Director of Common Weal, a 
pro-Scottish independence 
think tank 
RT, 
10.10.2017 
“Are Scotland and Catalonia’s 
independence struggles symptoms 
of EU oppression?” 
https://www.rt.com/uk/406231-
catalonia-scotland-independence-eu/  
Pablo Calderon 
Martinez, Dr. 
A lecturer in Spanish politics 
at Aston University, UK 
Sputnik, 
2.10.2017 
“The EU's 'Tough Spot': Why 
Brussels Is Largely Silent on the 
Catalan Referendum” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710021057875372-eu-catalonia-
referendum-silence/ 
Jose Luis Carretero 
Miramar 
 
Spanish political commentator Sputnik, 
8.09.2017  
“Thirst for Independence: Spain 
May 'Use Repressive Measures' 
Against Catalonia” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
09081057208748-spain-catalonia-
referendum-independence/  
Alejandro Quiroga, Dr 
 
Reader in Spanish history at 
Newcastle University 
Sputnik, 
2.10.2017 
“Catalonia Standoff: Spanish 
Constitution, 'Sons of Francoists' vs 
Independence” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710021057871769-catalonia-spain-
independence-crisis/  
RT (TV), 
29.09.2017 
“Hackers in Catalonia? Spanish 
media accuses Russians of keeping 
referendum site active” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r
vBOBSbTRUY   
Andrew Spannaus Journalist and political analyst 
based in Milan 
Sputnik, 
20.10.2017 
“Catalonia Referendum: Will 
‘Europe of Regions’ Become 
Viable?” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10201058389841-catalonia-
referendum-europe-of-regions/ 
Armando Fernández 
Steinko 
Professor of sociology at the 
Complutense University of 
Madrid 
Sputnik, 
28.09.2017 
“This Spanish Region Mulls 
Independence Vote, Following in 
Catalonia's Footsteps” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
709281057773183-spain-balearic-
islands-independence/  
Sputnik, 
6.10.2017 
“Catalonia: Spanish Government 
Behaves 'Like Machos'” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10061057998585-catalonia-
crackdown-machos/  
Ruben Tamboleo 
 
Political scientist, 
Complutense University of 
Madrid 
RT (TV), 
28.10.2017 
“Is Catalonia’s independence 
declaration valid? (VIDEO 
DEBATE)” 
https://www.rt.com/news/408048-
catalonia-independence-declaration-
debate/  
Alfonso Valero Principal lecturer at the 
Nottingham Trent University 
Sputnik, 
23.10.2017 
“Invoking Article 155 May Unlock 
Situation in Catalonia, Political 
Analyst Says” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710231058475366-bringing-country-
to-normality-madrid/  
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Mary Vincent Professor of Modern European 
History at Sheffield University 
Sputnik, 
4.10.2017 
“King of All Spaniards? Only 
'Unitary State' for Spain's 
'Constitutional Monarch'” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710041057946937-king-spain-
catalonia-crisis/  
Duncan Wheeler Professor at the University of 
Leeds, Chair of Spanish 
Studies 
Sputnik, 
27.10.2017 
“'Rajoy's Intransigence' Pushed 
Catalans 'Fed Up With Being 
Treated Like Kids'” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710271058603720-catalonia-
independence-mariano-rajoy/  
John Wight Scottish writer and political 
commentator. A supporter of 
the Crimean reunification with 
Russia (“Crimea is Russian, 
the matter is finished” 
13.03.2018) 
Sputnik, 
28.09.2017 
“From Scotland to Catalonia to 
Iraqi Kurdistan, Separatism Is in 
Vogue” 
https://sputniknews.com/columnists/
201709281057783191-age-of-
nationalism-catalonia-scotland-
kurdistan/  
Sputnik, 
2.10.2017 
“Catalonian Independence and the 
Ghosts of the Spanish Civil War”  
https://sputniknews.com/columnists/
201710021057867157-catalonia-
independence-spanish-civil-war/  
Sputnik, 
11.10.2017 
“The Role of Neoliberalism in 
Spain's Constitutional Crisis”  
https://sputniknews.com/columnists/
201710111058128898-neoliberalism-
spain-constitution-crisis/  
RT, 
27.10.2017 
“Madrid can only act by force’: 
Spain & Catalonia on a collision 
course”  
https://www.rt.com/news/408039-
madrid-catalonia-crash-course/  
RT (TV), 
28.10.2017 
“Undivided Attention: Tensions run 
high as Spanish PM dissolves 
Catalan govt” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_
3aml0quDl4  
Sputnik, 
30.10.2017 
“Catalan Independence Is Not 
Worth Dying For” 
https://sputniknews.com/columnists/
201710301058656065-catalonia-
independence-cultural-nationalism/ 
Alfred De Zayas Professor of international law 
at the Geneva School of 
Diplomacy and International 
Relations, UN Independent 
Expert on the Promotion of a 
Democratic and Equitable 
International Order 
Sputnik, 
27.10.2017 
“Catalan Situation 'Not a Vanity-
Type of Secession, Self-
Determination'”  
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710271058600850-catalonia-
independence-declaration-legal-
perspective/  
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Adrian Zelaia Spanish political analyst Sputnik, 
4.10.2017 
“'Historic Tension': Should Spain 
Brace for the Worst After Catalan 
Vote?” 
https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201
710041057927694-catalonia-
independence-referendum-violence/  
Politicians 
 
Pedro Agramunt  Spanish senator, People’s 
Party, former president of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe. On 28 
April 2017, after travelling to 
Syria to meet Bashar al-Assad, 
the Bureau of PACE said he is 
no longer authorized to 
undertake any official visits, 
attend meetings, or make 
public statements on behalf of 
the assembly in his capacity as 
president after a vote of no 
confidence on him. 
Sputnik, 
17.10.2017 
“Madrid-Catalonia Dispute Should 
Be Settled in Spanish Parliament - 
Ex-PACE Head”  
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10171058322485-spain-catalonia-
settlement-parliament/  
Oriol Amorós A Catalan MP of the 
Republican Left of Catalonia 
party (pro-independence) 
Sputnik, 
26.10.2017 
“Why One Catalan City Has 
Declared Spanish King Felipe VI 
Persona Non Grata”  
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10261058551323-spain-catalonia-
girona-king/  
Jose Maria Chiquillo 
Barber 
Senator for Valencia, People’s 
Party, member of the Spanish 
delegation to OSCE PA (anti-
independence) 
Sputnik, 
5.10.2017 
“EU 'Natural' Mediator for 
Catalonia-Spain Conflict - Spanish 
Lawmaker”  
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10051057971594-eu-catalonia-spain-
conflict/  
Olivier Berthelot 
 
President of the Parti Breton in 
Brittany (party got 13 000 
votes in the last election) 
Sputnik, 
12.10.2017 
“'Shared Prison': EU's Rejection of 
Catalonia Vote Shatters 
Independence Dreams” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10121058169344-catalonia-spain-
independence-referendum-eu/  
Bart Claes Member of the Belgian right-
wing Vlaams Belang (Flemish 
Interest) party 
Sputnik, 
12.10.2017 
„Catalan Referendum Police 
Violence Immoral - Belgian 
Politician“ 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10121058178251-eu-catalonia-
violence-referendum/  
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Alfred Bosch 
 
Member of Barcelona city 
council, leader of Republican 
Left on Barcelona City 
Council (pro-independence) 
RT, 
21.09.2017 
“Independence-hungry Scottish 
nationalist leader sends support to 
Catalonia”  
https://www.rt.com/uk/404104-
independence-catalonia-spain-
sturgeon/  
RT (TV), 
21.09.2017 
“Catalan referendum no more than 
impossible dream - Spanish PM” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
U4d3f0QlpAc 
RT, 
2.10.2017 
“‘Has Spain reverted to Franco-
style military dictatorship?’” 
https://www.rt.com/news/405374-
spain-catalonia-referendum-eu/  
RT, 
11.10.2017 
“‘Catalonia gave Spain last 
chance’” 
https://www.rt.com/news/406395-
catalonia-spain-independence-
autonomy/  
RT (TV), 
27.10.2017 
“Catalonia at Crossroads: Senate to 
vote on direct rule over region” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p
8vmV8iQn70  
Matt Carthy 
 
Irish MEP, Sinn Féin, 
European United Left-Nordic 
Green Left party group 
RT, 
3.10.2017 
“After Catalan crackdown, EU will 
look hypocritical preaching about 
democracy – Irish MEP” 
https://www.rt.com/news/405525-
catalonia-referendum-spain-eu/ 
Dario Castañé 
 
Pirate Party of Catalonia (not 
in parliament) 
RT (TV), 
29.09.2017 
“Hackers in Catalonia? Spanish 
media accuses Russians of keeping 
referendum site active” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r
vBOBSbTRUY  
David Coburn 
 
British MEP, leader of the 
Scottish UKIP 
RT (TV), 
27.10.2017 
“Landmark Vote: Catalan 
parliament votes for independence 
from Spain” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q
-5Ip3f1ekY  
RT (TV), 
27.10.2017 
“Independent Catalonia: Spanish 
PM appeals to Senate to seize 
Catalonia & dismiss leaders” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
v5a5JZHepc  
RT (TV), 
28.10.2017 
“Undivided Attention: Tensions run 
high as Spanish PM dissolves 
Catalan govt” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_
3aml0quDl4  
RT (TV), 
28.10.2017 
“Catalan President sacked by 
Madrid calls for peaceful resistance 
to Spain’s power takeover”  
https://www.rt.com/news/408091-
catalan-leader-speaks-independence/  
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RT (TV), 
29.10.2017 
“Catalan police chief resigns, urges 
officers to ‘stay loyal’ to Madrid-
appointed boss” 
https://www.rt.com/news/408116-
catalonia-police-chief-resigns-
loyalty/  
Bernard Daelemans 
 
Observer, board member of the 
International Commission of 
European Citizens, Flemish 
people’s movement 
RT (TV), 
1.10.2017 
“Catalonia's independence: 90% 
vote 'Yes' to break away from 
Spain” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j
49z9Q9mHoo  
RT (TV), 
10.10.2017 
“Catalan leader suspends 
declaration of independence, offers 
dialogue with Madrid” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2
6lEzTUMzlA  
RT, 
22.10.2017 
“Catalan crisis escalated by 
repressive actions of Spanish 
government – analysts”  
https://www.rt.com/news/407470-
catalonia-repression-spanish-
government/  
Gianmatteo Ferrari A member of Lega Nord, Vice 
President of the Lombardy-
Russian Cultural Association 
Sputnik, 
2.10.2017 
“Lawmaker Criticizes EU Over 
Failure to Condemn Spain's Use of 
Force in Catalonia” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10021057877213-spain-catalonia-
force/  
Ray Finch British MEP, UKIP RT, 
3.10.2017 
“After Catalan crackdown, EU will 
look hypocritical preaching about 
democracy – Irish MEP” 
https://www.rt.com/news/405525-
catalonia-referendum-spain-eu/  
Enric Folch International secretary of 
Catalan Solidarity for 
Independence (pro-
independence, party did not 
participate in the last elections) 
RT, 
16.09.2017 
“Catalan Secessionists Claim EU's 
Receptiveness Dictated by 
Economics” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
09161057449877-catalonia-
independence-vote/  
RT (TV), 
20.09.2017 
“Clashes with police in Catalonia 
ahead of independence vote” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
RZS7Dm2SmEk  
Sputnik, 
13.10.2017 
“Juncker Believes Catalonia’s 
Independence May Trigger Other 
Regions' Secession” 
https://sputniknews.com/europe/2017
10131058208650-eu-catalonia-
secession-independence/  
RT, 
27.10.2017 
“‘Madrid can only act by force’: 
Spain & Catalonia on a collision 
course” 
https://www.rt.com/news/408039-
madrid-catalonia-crash-course/  
RT (TV), 
27.10.2017 
“Landmark Vote: Catalan 
parliament votes for independence 
from Spain” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q
-5Ip3f1ekY  
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RT (TV), 
27.10.2017 
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https://www.rt.com/news/406022-
catalonia-rajoy-no-talks-police/ 
Valentin Anadon 
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2017. AASTA KATALOONIA ISESEISVUSREFERENDUM: RT JA SPUTNIKU 
LEVITATUD VENEMAA STRATEEGILISED NARRATIIVID 
Johannes Voltri 
Resümee 
Abhaasia ja Lõuna-Osseetia annekteerimisest saati 2008. aastal on Venemaa muutunud 
oma välispoliitiliselt hoiakult varasemast palju jõulisemaks ja isepäisemaks. Iseäranis 
päevakajaliseks on muutunud Venemaa mõjutuskatsed läänemaailmas, näiteks seoses 
USA ja Prantsusmaa presidendivalimistega. Süüdistused, et Venemaa üritab aktiivselt 
lääne poliitilisi protsesse enda kasuks kallutada kerkisid üles ka eelmise aasta oktoobris, 
kui toimus Kataloonia iseseisvusreferendum. Hispaania välisminister Alfonso Dastis on 
sõnanud, et neil on teavet, mis viitab, et Venemaalt viidi läbi teabeoperatsioon eesmärgiga 
Hispaaniat destabiliseerida. Seda kinnitas hiljem maikuus ka Saksamaa 
julgeolekuteenistuse BfV juht Hans-Georg Maassen. Venemaa välisminister Sergei 
Lavrov on süüdistusi aga meelekindlalt eitanud ning väitnud, et need on osa lääneriikides 
levivast Venemaavastasest hüsteeriast. 
Kuigi Venemaad on Hispaaniavastases mõjutustegevuses palju süüdistatud, pole siiski 
terviklikumaid akadeemilisi eritlusi väga palju läbi viidud, uurimused on keskendunud 
peaasjalikult hispaaniakeelsetele RT ja Sputniku väljaannetele ja sotsiaalmeediale. 
Käesolev töö kätkebki endas ülesannet küsimuses selgust tuua, uurides põhjalikumalt 
seda, kuidas kajastasid Kataloonia referendumit Venemaa valitsuse hallatavad 
ingliskeelsed meediaväljaanded RT ja Sputnik. 
Töö eesmärk on kindlaks teha, millised olid peamised trateegilised narratiivid, mida 
Venemaa RT ja Sputniku kajastusega läänemaailmale levitas ning siduda need Venemaa 
välispoliitikaga ehk üldisemalt Venemaa nägemusega sellest, kuidas rahvusvaheline 
süsteem peaks toimima. Muuhulgas otsib autor vastust sellele, miks Venemaa üleüldse 
Kataloonia vastu huvi tundis ning kuidas Venemaa kasutas erinevaid kommunikatiivseid 
vahendeid oma eesmärkide saavutamiseks. Autor seab hüpoteesi, et Venemaa kasutas 
sündmusi Kataloonias ära eesmärgiga nõrgestada Euroopa Liitu. 
Lähtuvalt Alister Miskimmoni, Ben O’Loughlini ja Laura Roselli’i kirjutistest vaatleb 
autor rahvusvahelisi suhteid ja kommunikatsiooni läbi strateegiliste narratiivide prisma, 
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sidudes selle Ernesto Laclau ja Chantal Mouffe’i diskursuseteooriaga. Need teooriad 
sobituvad omavahel hästi kokku, sest strateegiliste narratiivide teooria tugineb suuresti 
justnimelt poststrukturalistlikule diskursuseteooriale. 
Hüpoteesi tõestamiseks viis autor läbi diskursuseanalüüsi RT ja Sputniku 
veebiväljaannete (rt.com, sputniknews.com) kajastusest ning RT televisioonikajastusest, 
mis oli leitav RT Youtube’i lehelt. Uurimisvahemikuks valis autor 1.09.2017–31.10.2017 
ehk umbes kuu enne ja pärast referendumit. Kokku avaldas Sputnik selles ajavahemikus 
257 ja RT 165 Kataloonia sündmusi puudutavat artiklit, millele lisandus veel 51 videot 
RT Youtube’i kanalilt.  
Diskursuseanalüüsi tulemusena selgus, et meediaväljaannete kajastus oli selgelt 
iseseisvusmeelsete poole kaldu, osalt juba seetõttu, et suurem osa meedias ülesastunud 
arvamusliidritest olid iseseisvusmeelsed. Nii näiteks kujutati meetmeid, mida Hispaania 
valitsus referendumi ärajätmiseks ette võttis kui frankoistlike, mis ei käi kokku 
demokraatliku riigi aluspõhimõtetega. Iseseisvusmeelseid näidati aga kui tavalisi inimesi, 
kes põhjendatult oma õigusi ja vabadusi taotlevad. Mõlema poole kohta käivaid 
stereotüüpe võimendati ka kommunikatiivselt, näidates näiteks Hispaania politsei 
vägivalda aegluubis pingelise muusika taustal. 
Pingestatud ning kohati vägivallale kiskuv olukord Kataloonias andis Venemaale ideaalse 
võimaluse pingeid veelgi võimendada ning seeläbi kogu probleemiteravik Euroopa Liidu 
poole suunata. Lähtudes Miskimmoni jt strateegiliste narratiivide kolmesest jaotusest 
(poliitika-, identiteedi- ja süsteeminarratiivid) tegi autor kindlaks, et poliitikatasandil 
argumenteeris Venemaa Euroopa Liidu sekkumise poolt Kataloonias. See oleks andnud 
konfliktile kohe ka rahvusvahelise mõõtme. Kui selgus, et Euroopa Liit jääb 
kõrvaltvaataja rolli, hakkas Venemaa levitama Euroopa Liidu vastu suunatud 
identiteedinarratiivi, süüdistades viimast silmakirjalikkuses ja topeltstandardites. 
Venemaa üritas näidata, et Euroopa Liit, mis peaks olema euroopalike ja demokraatlike 
väärtuste kehastuseks ning seeläbi etaloniks teistele riikidele, ei ühti retoorikas tegelikult 
oma tegudega. Ühe peamise näitena kõrvutati nii näiteks Kataloonia iseseisvuspüüdlusi 
Kosovo iseseisvumisega, juhtides tähelepänu tõigale et kui Kosovo puhul oli Euroopa 
Liit iseseisvuse poolt olnud, siis nüüd on ta Kataloonia justkui hüljanud.  
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Euroopa Liidu olemuse nõrgestamine oli tihedalt seotud Venemaa üldisema 
süsteemitasandi strateegilise narratiiviga, mis kujutas liitu kui nõrka ning lagunevat. Nii 
näiteks ilmus uurimisperioodi vältel RT-lt ja Sputnikult arvukalt artikleid, mis käsitlesid 
Euroopa Liidus pead tõstvaid separatistlikke liikumisi (isegi nii marginaalseid kui nt 
Ahvenamaa iseseisvusliikumine), arvumusartiklites aga toodi välja, et separatistlikud 
liikumised ongi suurelt jaolt tekkinud Euroopa Liidu süül.  
Venemaa meediaväljaannete kajastust ning huvi Kataloonia sündmuste vastu võib seega 
laiemalt vaadelda kui püüet nõrgestada lääne ülevõimu ning seeläbi püüelda 
mitmepooluselise maailmakorra poole, kus Venemaa rahvusvaheline roll oleks senisest 
suurem. Seega leidis kinnitust ka autori seatud hüpotees, et Venemaa kajastas Kataloonia 
sündmusi ära nõrgestamaks Euroopa Liitu. 
Olukorras, kus suhted läänemaailma ja Venemaa vahel on pingestatud ja meedias levib 
palju narratiive selle kohta, kuidas peaks maailma sündmusi mõistma ja tõlgendama, on 
oluline, et tõde ridade vahel kaduma ei läheks. Töö annab olulise panuse selgitamaks 
Venemaa teabeoperatsioonide mõjuulatust ja tehnikaid ning näitab, et Venemaa tegevus 
ei piirdu vaid lähinaabrusega, vaid ulatub kaugemalegi, kus Venemaa ei pruugi olla 
konfiktis aktiivne osapool. Kuna Venemaa eesmärgid on sel juhul ka keerulisemalt 
hoomatavad, on oht, et mõjutustegevus võib jääda esmapilgul sootuks märkamatuks.  
Tuleb silmas pidada, et töös käsitleti pelgalt seda, kuidas ja milliseid strateegilisi 
narratiive Venemaa levitab. Saamaks täielikumat pilti Venemaa teabeoperatsioonidest 
ning mõjutustegevusest tuleks põhjalikumalt eritleda ka seda, kuidas Venemaa 
strateegilised narratiivid on üldse tekkinud ning kuidas meedia tarbijaskond need omaks 
võtab, näiteks millist mõju on RT ja Sputniku Euroopa Liidu vaenulik kajastus avaldanud 
Euroopa Liidule. Kõike seda tuleks aga teha, võttes arvesse 21. sajandi meediaökoloogiat, 
kus rahvusvahelised tegutsejad toetuvad omavahelisel suhtlusel aina enam 
sotsiaalmeediale. 
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